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ABSTRACT 
 
This Masters Thesis is a synthesis of two papers that address how changes in global 
industrial structures affect regional-specific industrial organization. The first paper is a 
characterization of the response of Indonesian manufacturing firms to the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. The second paper is a characterization of the how to induce a 
response from firms (specifically multinational seed companies) with research 
capacities in the agricultural biotechnology sector in developing countries.  
 The lessons from both papers are broadly centered on effective growth policies 
and it’s relation of private sector and foreign direct investments. Specifically, an 
economic development agenda concentrated only on the private sector will not 
necessarily guarantee that firms will take advantage of ideal economic scenarios. As 
the case of Indonesian firms demonstrated, uncertainty and perceptions of the local 
economy affect the extent to which the private sector should have led growth through 
exports during devaluation of the Indonesian currency. In contrast, the capacity for 
research and development in agricultural biotechnology is grossly underdeveloped in 
Africa, and limited to only a few countries. The massive intellectual capacity of a 
largely consolidated seed industry actually becomes beneficial for firms to take greater 
risks and spur sector development.  
 Reading the following papers as a policy maker, one would thus gain valuable 
insight to the complexities of industrial development. As a researcher and student, one 
should be interested in these studies as a call attention to areas with potential for future 
research. The implications of research into firm-level response of Indonesian export 
firms will greatly affect future empirical work on trade theory and economic growth 
policies because it highlights a circumstance that runs somewhat contrary to trade 
theory predictions. Policies need to take into account the extent to firm response to 
  
financial crisis and ability to face adverse economic situations. The immediacy of risk-
analysis research in the biotechnology sector in Africa is equally important and un-
exhaustive. If foreign investments are to play an important role in the development 
strategy for African countries, it must take into account the decision making processes 
of firms willing to take on high-cost projects with low immediate returns. 
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A Firm-Level Examination of the Exports Puzzle: Why East Asian Exports Didn’t 
Increase After the 1997-1998 Financial Crisis? 
Abstract 
 
We analyze a detailed panel dataset of Indonesian Manufacturing firms to find reasons 
for the exports puzzle: the surprising absence of exports-led growth after the massive 
currency devaluation of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. Our results show that, 
consistent with trade theory predictions for better terms of trade, the rate of entry into 
export markets increased dramatically. At the same time, however, a large number of 
pre-crisis exporters quit exporting even in the presence of a much more advantageous 
exchange rate. In total, the absence of an export boom cannot be attributed to lack of 
entrepreneurial ambition or activity amongst would-be exporters. Rather, the absence 
of a boom is the result of some constraint that prohibited many pre-crisis exporters 
from continuing. Managerial reports of perceived constraints reveal little information 
on why so many firms ceased exporting. However, “better” firms, proxied by foreign 
ownership, engagement in research and development, or investment in training, were 
more likely to continue exporting post-crisis.  
1. Introduction 
Trade theory predicts that currency devaluation will stimulate exports since 
goods in the country experiencing the devaluation become comparatively cheaper. The 
massive devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah during the 1997-1998 Asian financial 
crisis is an extreme context in which to observe this phenomenon empirically. The 
value of the rupiah plummeted from about 2,000 rupiah to about 8,000 rupiah to the 
U.S. dollar. Figure 1.1 shows rupiah to dollar exchange rate and the Indonesian 
consumer price index over the same period. Accounting for inflation, a U.S. dollar 
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bought more than twice the volume of Indonesian goods in 1998 as it did in 1996. 
This 2 to 1 real devaluation is the largest in recent history. Indonesian exporters, 
particularly those using predominantly non-tradable local inputs, gained an 
unprecedented comparative advantage and should have rapidly increased exported 
production. 
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Figure 1.1: The Rupiah/Dollar Exchange Rate and Indonesian Consumer Price Index, 
by Month. CPI base is 100. 
Examination of aggregate exports data, however, does not attest to this 
prediction. Despite better terms of trade that provided incentives for firms to divert 
production into export markets, the aggregate volume of Indonesian exports did not 
increase. The surprising absence of an export boom, which we coin the “exports 
puzzle,” was not limited to Indonesia. Figure 1.2 shows that other countries in the 
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region which experienced devaluations, albeit less severe than that of Indonesia, also 
had stagnant export growth. 
Studies attempting to explain the absence of an export boom following the 
Asian financial crisis have concentrated on macroeconomic factors and have not 
established a consensus. Exploiting a rich panel dataset of Indonesian manufacturers, 
we add to this literature by disaggregating the macro phenomena to the firm level. 
Specifically, we ask two questions: 1) how did firm exporting behavior change in 
response to the devaluation and, 2) if firms vary in their response to the devaluation, 
can firms’ perception of constraints or managerial attributes predict the varied 
response? Our motivation is that firm-level analysis of the exports puzzle might reveal 
patterns masked in macroeconomic studies and thus inform policy to promote export-
led growth. 
Our results indicate that following devaluation there was a notable rise in 
entrepreneurial activity—the initiation of exporting by existing firms and the creation 
of new exporting firms—by those exploiting better terms of trade, as predicted by 
trade theory. However, contrary to trade theory, a large number of pre-crisis exporters 
contemporaneously ceased all exporting activity. The total lost export volume 
attributable to exiting firms roughly balanced the new export volume generated by 
entering firms, thus explaining the overall absence of an export boom. The rate of 
entry and exit from export markets increased markedly during and after the crisis. 
Attempts to explain this high turnover yield mixed results. On one hand, firms’ 
perceptions of economic constraints differed little between firms that stopped 
exporting post-crisis and those that continued. On the other hand, firm attributes often 
associated with more advanced firms, such as foreign ownership, research and 
development activity, and investments in training, increased the likelihood that a firm 
would exploit exporting opportunities following the devaluation. 
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Figure 1.2: Growth of Export Volume and Value of Selected East Asian Countries 
Source: International Monetary Fund Statistical Database/ World Bank Statistical 
Database 
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Figure 1.2: (Continued) 
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the literature on 
Indonesian exporting activity after the crisis and, in Section 3 we provide some 
background information on the Indonesian economy. Section 4 discusses possible 
explanations for the exports puzzle and Section 5 introduces the data and methodology 
we use to consider those explanations. Section 6 discusses our results and Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Comparative Advantage and the Global Export Market: What We Know 
About the East Asian Crisis 
Several studies have attempted to explain the stagnant export growth in 
Indonesia and other East Asian countries following the crisis. A drop in foreign 
demand is often cited as a primary cause of the absence of export boom following 
devaluation. To an extent this is true. Hallwards-Dreimeier et al (2000) find that firms 
in their analysis primarily complained of a collapse in domestic demand. Due to the 
importance of interregional trade between most East Asian countries at that time, this 
domestic demand drop also translated into a fall in foreign demand. Amongst Korean, 
Malaysian and Thai exporters, lack of foreign demand and stability of foreign markets 
was perceived as the biggest factor in decline in export performance. However, these 
exporters were also less likely to attribute a decline in overall output to fall in foreign 
demand since only a small share of output was generally intended for export. Further, 
the perceived importance of demand was not consistent throughout the affected 
countries. Fillipino firms were less likely to attribute slowdown in export growth to 
lack of domestic or even foreign demand because of structural competitiveness 
problems. These firms were also more likely to export to the US rather than within 
East Asia. Duttagupta and Spilimbergo (2004) attribute the notable lag in export 
volume from East Asia to the short-run price inelasticity of Asian exports rather than 
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an exogenous shift in world demand for East Asian exports or an overall global 
economic slowdown. 
In addition, better terms of trade and structural changes to Indonesia’s trade 
regime implemented during the Uruguay Round should have benefited exporters. 
Anderson and Strutt (1999) used a global, economy-wide GTAP model to project that 
economic growth of Indonesia should have continued despite financial crisis because 
of the breadth of opportunities resulting from the trade reform. Textiles and clothing 
sectors were expected to experience the biggest gains due to a lifting of exporting 
restraints. Anderson and Strutt projected that, even when accounting for interruptions 
to economic growth resulting from the financial crisis, exports in agriculture should 
have continued to rise. 
In sum, the incentive and opportunity for post-crisis exporting was clear. 
Indonesian exports were comparatively inexpensive relative to pre-devaluation prices, 
worldwide demand seemed steady, and structural barriers to Indonesian products 
appeared to be weakening. The exports puzzle thus demands a more granular 
examination of individual potential exporters. 
3. Indonesia Background 
In the early 1990s, Indonesia, like Thailand and Malaysia, was one of the ‘East 
Asian Miracle’ economies cited by the World Bank as an example of the benefits of 
market-oriented reform. Export-oriented and foreign-owned manufacturing firms 
fueled much of the growth in the industrial sector and unabated optimization caused 
capital to flow into Jakarta. Despite seemingly strong economic fundamentals, 
widespread financial panic instigated by the collapse of the Thai baht plunged 
Indonesia into a devastating financial crisis. GDP growth fell from 8 percent in 1996 
to minus 13 percent in 1998. This decline in economic activity was accompanied with 
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widespread capital flight that dramatically weakened the rupiah. At the height of the 
crisis, the rupiah was worth merely 15 percent of its value six months earlier. 
Over-reliance on short-term overseas borrowing, instability of global financial 
markets, under regulated and poorly monitored domestic financial systems and “crony 
capitalist” relations between the public and private sector are widely cited as 
contributing to the crisis (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Stiglitz, 1998; Krugman, 1998). 
Indeed, these structural problems may have created constraints on post-crisis exporting 
activity and, in part, explain the exports puzzle. We examine firms’ perceptions of 
these constraints in our analysis below. 
4. Why No Exports Boom? 
4.1 Regional Effects 
Two regional effects may have contributed to stagnant post-crisis export 
growth in East Asia. First, many East Asian economies exported to nearby neighbors, 
which also experienced devaluation and were less able to afford imports. Second, the 
comparative advantage created by the devaluation may have been offset by the fact 
that many countries pegged their currency to the U.S. dollar, which was appreciating 
relative to the yen and the euro. Coresetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a and 1998b) 
attribute deteriorating cost-competitiveness in East Asia to currencies that were 
pegged to an appreciating U.S. dollar. Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (2000) suggest 
that although pegging the baht to the dollar was beneficial in the early 1990s, the 
appreciation of the dollar by almost 40 percent between 1994 and 1996 relative to the 
Japanese yen stimulated the decline of exports to Japan. As a result of the dollar peg, 
the rate of export growth began to decline in 1995, before the crisis (Barth and 
Dinmore, 1999).  
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4.2 Financial Constraints 
The crisis in East Asia was not strictly a monetary crisis, but also a financial 
crisis characterized by an insolvent banking sector. Most banks in Indonesia did not 
meet reserve requirements in 1998 and under threat of closure by IMF reforms, may 
have been unwilling to continue lending. Banks with cash to lend had difficulty 
distinguishing between insolvent borrowers—for whom new loans would go toward 
old loan repayment rather than productive investments—and firms that legitimately 
needed funds for ongoing operations or attractive investments. In addition, many firms 
had large, unhedged foreign currency debts that dramatically increased their debt to 
equity ratio and reduced their credit worthiness. If would-be exporters could not obtain 
working capital, then financial constraints could explain part of the exports puzzle. 
Evidence of financial constraints is mixed. Hallward-Dreimeier et al. (2000) 
did not report an aggregate shortfall of credit availability in their firm-level analysis. 
Instead, they find that declining demand and lack of price competitiveness caused 
fewer to seek credit in the first place. In other words, they attribute reductions in 
extended credit to a fall in demand rather than a fall in supply. Similarly, Duttagupta 
and Spilimbergo (2004) find weak support for credit constraints using a long-run 
demand and supply estimation approach. Dollar and Hallward-Dreimeier (2000) also 
found little support for a credit crunch in a firm-level analysis of Thai manufacturing 
firms. 
In contrast, comparison of foreign and domestic firm investment patterns 
shows that foreign firms, which have greater access to overseas credit sources, invest 
more than equivalent domestic firms (Blalock, Gertler, Levine, 2005). Desai, Foley 
and Hines (2003) suggest that foreign affiliates often substitute internal borrowing for 
external borrowing when operating in environments with poorly developed financial 
markets.  
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4.3 Infrastructure 
Another obstacle to an export boom may have been insufficient infrastructure. 
In particular, the financial crisis in Indonesia also prompted a political crisis, which 
may have handicapped the operation or expansion of facilities and institutions needed 
to sustain export activities. For example, access to ports and roads may have 
constrained exporting (World Bank, 1999). Further, would-be exporters may have 
been dependent on suppliers who were unable to sustain operations in the economic 
slowdown following the crisis. 
4.4 Export Status and Barrier to Entry Post-Crisis 
Barriers to entry might have prevented more firms, likely smaller or less 
productive ones, from entering the export market. Bernard (1999) suggested that 
although current export status is generally a poor predictor of future performance, 
good firms become good exporters. That is, future exporters embody desirable 
characteristics for export performance several years before they enter the export 
market. Specifically, the reason “good firms” enter the export market has to do with 
their ability to mitigate the costs of entry, which less successful firms cannot 
overcome. Even in the presence of an unanticipated devaluation shock, many firms 
may have been lacked the necessary skills and capability to divert production to export 
markets. In addition, would-be exporters may be unable to devote the time and 
expense needed to establish overseas marketing channels. 
5. Data and Methods 
Our approach is to examine a detailed panel dataset on Indonesian 
manufacturing establishments and identify patterns in the composition and 
characteristics of exporters before and after the crisis. The principal dataset is the 
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Survei Tahunan Perusahaan Industri Pengolahan (SI), the Annual Manufacturing 
Survey conducted by the Industrial Statistics Division of Indonesia’s Central Bureau 
of Statistics (known by the Indonesian acronym, BPS). The SI dataset is designed to 
be a complete annual enumeration of all manufacturing establishments with 20 or 
more employees from 1975 onward.1 Depending on the year, the SI includes up to 160 
variables covering industrial classification (5-digit ISIC), ownership (public, private, 
foreign), status of incorporation, assets, asset changes, electricity, fuels, income, 
output, expenses, investment, labor (head count, education, wages), raw material use, 
machinery, and other specialized questions.  
BPS submits a questionnaire annually to all registered manufacturing establishments; 
field agents attempt to visit each non-respondent to either encourage compliance or 
confirm that the establishment has ceased operation. In recent years over 20,000 
factories have been surveyed annually. We used industry wholesale price indexes to 
deflate our output values to 1988 rupiah. 
In cooperation with the World Bank, BPS surveyed 935 manufacturing firms 
in 1998 to assess the impact of the financial crisis on firm operations. The firms were 
selected from the principle manufacturing sectors: electronics, textiles and garments, 
food processing, chemicals and machinery. The survey consisted of various questions 
on perceptions of costs and access to business services after the financial crisis. In 
particular, the survey asks firms if they reduced production after the crisis and, if so, 
why. 
                                                 
1 Some firms may have more than one factory, each of which would appear as a separate establishment 
in the dataset. BPS also submits a different questionnaire to the head office of every firm with more 
than one factory. Although these data were not available for this study, early analysis suggests that there 
are relatively few establishments belong to multi-factory firms. We thus generalize our results to firms. 
But, each reference to a “firm” in this paper is should be more precisely considered a reference to an 
“establishment.” 
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Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we disaggregate total Indonesian 
manufacturing exports at the firm level to understand how exporting behavior changed 
before and after the crisis. Second, we examine the subset of firms in the World Bank 
dataset to determine if firm perceptions of output constraints can explain changes in 
exporting behavior. Third, we return to the full dataset to see if other firm attributes or 
capabilities can explain variation in exporting behavior. To be clear, we cannot 
directly test the various explanations for the absence of an export boom described 
above; however, our results are more consistent with some explanations than with 
others and suggest directions for future research. 
To explore how exporting behavior changes over time, our analysis 
categorized exporters into one of five mutually exclusive types: Quitting Exporters, 
Starting Exporters, Continuing Exporters, Entering Exporters and Dying Exporters. 
For a given year, we define a Continuing Exporter as an exporting firm that will 
survive and export into the next year and had exported in the previous year. We define 
a Starting Exporter to be an exporting firm that had produced only for the domestic 
market the previous year and will survive until the next year. We define an Entering 
Exporting to be a firm that exports in its first year in the panel and survives until the 
next year. A Quitting Exporter is an exporting firm that will not export in the next year 
but will survive as a domestic producer.2 Lastly, a Dying Exporter is an exporting firm 
that does not survive into the next year. The definitions are all relative to the focal 
year, so exporting firms may switch categories over the course of the panel. But, for 
each focal year, the categorizations are mutually exclusive. 
For example, in 1996 there were 1,432 Continuing Exporters; firms that 
exported in 1995, 1996, and 1997. There were also 371 Starting Exporters, firms that 
                                                 
2 A small number of Starting and Entering Exporters only exported one year, and thus also qualify for 
the definition of a Quitting exporter.  We treat these firms as Quitting Exporters. 
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in 1995 produced solely for the domestic market but exported in 1996. If some of 
these firms continue to export in 1997 and 1998, they will be reclassified as a 
Continuing Exporter in 1997. There were also 216 Entering Exporting firms in 1996; 
similarly if these firms export in 1997 and 1998, they will be reclassified as 
Continuing Exporters in 1997. In 1996 there were 1,851 Quitting Exporters, for which 
1996 was the last year of exporting. They survive into 1997, but no longer as an 
exporter. 
6. Results 
6.1 Changes in Exporting Behavior 
We start by identifying pre-crisis aggregate export trends. Figure 1.3 shows the 
volume of manufactured output and the share of total output volume that is exported. 
Export volume and share was rising until 1996, after which time both measures drop 
precipitously. The reversal in export share growth suggests that pre-existing trends 
cannot explain the exports puzzle. Moreover, the fall in total production suggests that 
redirecting production to meet increasing domestic demand does not explain stagnant 
export growth. 
We next disaggregate these trends by exporter type. Figure 1.4 shows the 
distribution of total export volume amongst the five exporter categories. Because the 
categories are mutually exclusive, these portions must sum to one. The most striking 
result is the sharp drop in the portion of exports attributed to Continuing Exporters. 
Recall that since all Continuing Exporters become, by construction, Quitting exporters 
in their last year of exporting, the fall in Continuing Exporter portion is accompanied 
by a large rise in the Quitting Exporter portion. This trend shows that long-established 
exporters were entering the last year of exporting in the years following the crisis. The 
implication of this finding is that many firms exporting before the crisis were unable 
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to continue, despite better terms of trade. Further, because the rate of exit from export 
markets increases markedly, the high turnover reflects a change in firm behavior rather 
than a pre-existing trend. 
Exports manufactured by firms that ceased exporting after the crisis 
represented a substantial portion of the pre-crisis total. The bottom panel of Figure 1.5 
shows in that 1995 firms that would survive the crisis but cease exporting contributed 
7.82 billion in exports. This contribution is roughly half of the 1995 exports 
attributable to firms that continued to export post-crisis. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Total Exported Volume and Share of Output Exported, by Year 
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At the same time that many firms stopped exporting, other firms were able to 
take advantage of the better terms of trade. Figure 1.4 shows a sharp increase in the 
portion of total exports attributable to Entering and Starting Exporters. The bottom 
panel of Figure 5 puts this gain in perspective to the loss due to Exiting Exporters. The 
output volume of the firms that began exporting post-crisis roughly equals the pre-
crisis volume produced by firms that either did not survive the crisis or did not 
continue to export. Further, as shown in the top panel of Figure 1.5, the increase in 
export share by Starting and Entering Exporters was due to a notable increase in 
number of firms rather than the actions of a few, large firms. Between 1996 and 1999, 
4,250 firms in the sample left the export market as a Quitting Exporter or as a Dying 
Exporter. At the same time, 2,110 firms entered the export market as a Starter 
Exporter or as an Entering Exporter.  
Figure 1.4: Share of Export Volume, by Export Type, by Year 
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Figure 1.5: Change in Composition of Exporting Firm Status Pre-Crisis vs. Post-Crisis 
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The sharp increase in the number of firms entering the export market testifies 
to the better terms of trade as well as the entrepreneurial ambition and cost-efficiency 
of many Indonesian firms. Figure 1.6 shows further evidence. New firms that exported 
(Entering Exporters) between 1997 and 2000 exported a greater share of their output 
than that of earlier years. This trend is an indication that they were founded to take 
advantage of the better exporting opportunities. Similarly, existing firms that began 
exporting (Starting Exporters) exported a greater share of output post-crisis than pre-
crisis. At the same time, Quitting Exporters tended to decrease the amount of output 
intended for the export market. Why these firms, which presumably had the most 
experience and familiarity with overseas markets, reduced the export share and then 
ceased exporting remains a mystery. 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Total Production Volume, Exported Volume and Share  
of Exported Output, by Exporting Category, by Year 
To explore the relative attractiveness of industries for new exporters, Figure 
1.7 shows the changes in export volume and share for Starting Exporters before and 
after the crisis. The non-metallic minerals and leather and textiles industries exhibited 
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the greatest increase in export volume. The higher share of output exported in these 
sectors by Starting Exporters also demonstrate their relative attractiveness.  
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Figure 1.7: Export Attractiveness, Starting Exporters, by 2-Digit ISIC 
Figures 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 show exporting behavior by foreign and domestic 
ownership status. Consistent with conventional wisdom that foreign firms are more 
export-oriented, foreign Starting Exporters tend to export a greater share of their 
output. Foreign Continuing Exporters tended to export almost exclusively, whereas 
domestic Continuing Exporters also served the domestic market. Amongst Quitting 
Exporters during the crisis, however, both domestic and foreign firms shifted a large 
proportion of their output to the domestic market in their last year of exporting.  
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Figure 1.8: Total Production Volume, Exported Volume and Share of Output  
Exported for Starting Exporting Firms 
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Figure 1.9: Total Production Volume, Exported Volume and Share of Output  
Exported for Continuing Exporting Firms 
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Figure 1.10: Total Production Volume, Exported Volume and Share of Output 
Exported for Quitting Exporting Firms 
Taken together, our results show that many firms were successfully able to 
start exporting at the same time that many established exporters abandoned overseas 
markets. The firms that did start to export were very export-intensive, particularly in 
the chemical and glass and clay industries. And, lastly, both new and continuing 
foreign exporters exported a greater share of output than their domestic counterparts, 
especially after the crisis. Having described the general trends in exporting behavior, 
we now ask which firm-level attributes explain the variance in post-crisis exporting 
outcomes. 
6.2 Firm Perceptions of Constraints 
A surprising finding above is that a large number of pre-crisis exporters 
stopped exporting while many firms simultaneously became new exporters post-crisis. 
To try to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent findings, we analyze the detailed 
World Bank dataset to see if firms’ perceptions of business constraints offer an 
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explanation. In particular, we use a two-sample t-test to check for statistically different 
survey responses between different exporting groups using our definitions. Most of the 
survey questions asked firms to respond on a 5-point Likert scale and we compared 
median responses.  
An inherent limitation of the World Bank survey is censoring of non-surviving 
firms. Before analyzing the survey response, we estimate a survival equation on the 
sample of firms existing in 1995 to see how survivorship might affect the World Bank 
subset. Table 1.1 displays the results of a logit regression with the dependent variable 
a dummy variable indicating survival until 2000. Surprisingly, pre-crisis foreign 
ownership, export status and productivity have little effect on survival.3 Rather, size in 
terms of capital and labor best explain survival. Thus, we recognize that many smaller 
firms may have been censored from the World Bank dataset. 
Table 1.2 displays the survey questions we examined. We categorized each 
question to one of the three possible explanations for the exports puzzle described 
above: financial constraints, regional effects, and infrastructure limitations. For each 
question, we checked for difference in the median response between firms that 
exported before and after the crisis versus firms that exported only before the crisis. 
Table 1.3 shows the number of pre-crisis and post-crisis exporters in the sample. 349 
firms were exporting before the crisis and 179 of those continued to export after the 
crisis. Thus, 170 firms apparently ceased exporting but continued to sell to the 
domestic market. Unfortunately, the response rate for many questions was low, so our 
effective sample size was often significantly smaller. 
Questions related the liquidity constraints showed the only noticeable 
difference across the firm types. Indonesian-owned continuing exporters reported that 
                                                 
3 We discuss our measure of productivity below. Briefly, we use a translog production function and a 
high value indicated a more productive firm. 
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a higher percentage of financing from income from sales both before the crisis 
(median of 45% versus 30%) and after the crisis (median of 50% versus 30%). These 
differences, although consistent with the possibility of liquidity problems, are not 
statistically significant and there are no noticeable differences between the two groups 
in response to related questions. 
On questions related to regional effects, pre- and post-crisis exporters were 
similar to just pre-crisis exporters in their perceptions of output decline due to a fall in 
domestic or foreign demand. Further, responses on whether the firm’s biggest 
competitor was also located in a crisis country were not statistically different between 
firms that did and did not continue to export post-crisis.  
On questions related to perceived infrastructure constraints, we once again find 
little difference. Firms that exited export markets were no more statistically likely to 
report problems with infrastructure than firms that continued exporting. 
In sum, the World Bank dataset reveals little to explain differences between 
firms that continued to export post-crisis and firms that stopped. Several reasons could 
explain this finding. First, the number of exporting firms in the World Bank sub-
sample is small and may lack enough observations to identify statistically significant 
differences. Second, because we are making unconditional comparisons, firm 
heterogeneity between the two groups may be masking differences that would be 
revealed with if we compared better-matched firms. Third, the World Bank question 
responses could be affected by typical survey problems, such as recall bias. Fourth, 
it’s possible that the explanations for the exports puzzle that we examine are simply 
that wrong ones and we need to look at other issues. Regardless of the reason, we must 
look elsewhere to understand the changes in firms’ post-crisis exporting behavior. 
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Table 1.1: Likelihood of Survival Post-Crisis 
Dependent Variable: Firm Survived Post-Crisis 
(1/0) 
 (1)  
Capital 0.077  
 (5.60)**  
Labor 0.460  
 (16.94)**  
Export Status Pre-Crisis 0.079  
 (1.50)  
Foreign Ownership Pre-
Crisis 
0.004  
 (0.04)  
Productivity 0.039  
 (0.86)  
Textile and Leather (ISIC 32) -0.443  
 (8.11)**  
Wood (ISIC 33) -0.511  
 (8.49)**  
 Paper  (ISIC 34) -0.008  
 (0.08)  
 Chemicals, Coal, Rubber 
and Plastic  (ISIC 35) 
0.070  
 (0.98)  
Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products  (ISIC 36) 
-0.125  
 (1.95)  
Basic Metal   (ISIC 37) 0.233  
 (0.90)  
Fabricated Metal (ISIC 38) -0.393  
 (5.95)**  
Other    (ISIC 39) -0.554  
 (4.38)**  
Number of Establishments 14984  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table 1.2: World Bank Survey Questions 
Regional 
Effects 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output to decline in domestic 
demand? (1-5) 
 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output to decline in foreign 
demand? (1-5) 
 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output to depreciation of 
rupiah on increased input costs (1-5) 
 
Which of the following categories do you consider your biggest competitor? 
(Other domestics, foreign, firms in other countries….) 
 
Financial 
Constraints 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output to insufficient credit 
being extended by suppliers (1-5) 
 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output, at currency interest 
rates, to insufficient credit available from bank for working capital (1-5) 
 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output, at currency interest 
rates, to insufficient credit available from bank for expansion (1-5) 
 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output to high level of interest 
rates (1-5) 
 
Infrastructure 
Limitations 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output to increased labor 
costs (1-5) 
 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output to shortage of raw 
materials (1-5) 
 
To what extent do you attribute the decline in output to suppliers hurt by the 
crisis by not delivering goods (1-5) 
 
Lack of quality of local suppliers perceived as most important bottleneck in 
production? (1-5) 
 
Lack of suppliers of machinery and equipment as most important 
bottleneck in production? (1-5) 
 Infrastructure Service as most important bottleneck in production? (1-5) 
 
Quality and supply of skilled workers as most important bottleneck in 
production? (1-5) 
 
Quality and supply of production workers as most important bottleneck in 
production? (1-5) 
 Labor costs as most important bottleneck in production? (1-5) 
 Minimum costs as most important bottleneck in production? (1-5) 
 What is your perception of electricity service? (1-5) 
 What is your perception of water service? (1-5) 
 What is your perception of waste management service? (1-5) 
 What is your perception of transportation of goods service? (1-5) 
 
What was the capacity utilization of this factory in 1996, Jan-June 1997, 
July-Dec 1997, Jan-June 1998 and July-Oct 1998 (%) 
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Table 1.3: Sample Size of Firms under Analysis in World Bank dataset 
Exporting Type Number of Establishments 
Pre-Crisis Exporters 229 
Post-Crisis Exporters 172 
Total Firms in Sample: 842 
 
Table 1.4: Likelihood of Pre-Crisis Exporters to Continue Exporting Post-Crisis 
Dependent Variable: Pre-Crisis Exporters that Exported Post-Crisis (1/0)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Foreign Ownership Pre-Crisis 1.527    1.357 
 (5.48)**    (2.90)** 
Productivity  1.016   0.900 
  (0.19)   (1.14) 
R&D Expenditure   1.577  1.408 
   (7.26)**  (4.16)** 
Engaged in Training Programs    1.760 1.864 
    (9.01)** (7.87)** 
Total number of employees 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (6.03)** (4.97)** (5.43)** (5.03)** (3.41)** 
Textile and Leather (ISIC 32) 0.877 0.865 0.948 0.934 0.882 
 (1.39) (1.25) (0.56) (0.68) (1.01) 
Wood (ISIC 33) 1.362 1.189 1.430 1.439 1.348 
 (3.41)** (1.56) (3.91)** (3.83)** (2.53)* 
Paper  (ISIC 34) 0.492 0.465 0.508 0.477 0.420 
 (3.21)** (2.88)** (3.05)** (3.17)** (3.01)** 
Chemicals, Coal, Rubber and Plastic  
(ISIC 35) 
0.958 1.081 0.992 0.984 0.974 
 (0.40) (0.60) (0.08) (0.15) (0.19) 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products   
(ISIC 36) 
0.719 0.588 0.731 0.773 0.605 
 (1.91) (2.57)* (1.80) (1.43) (2.30)* 
Basic Metal   (ISIC 37) 0.675 0.722 0.713 0.624 0.539 
 (1.46) (0.97) (1.26) (1.68) (1.71) 
Fabricated Metal (ISIC 38) 0.542 0.595 0.635 0.627 0.528 
 (5.09)** (3.72)** (3.88)** (3.75)** (4.08)** 
Other (ISIC 39) 0.876 0.898 0.964 1.070 0.950 
 (0.81) (0.53) (0.22) (0.39) (0.23) 
Observations 5238 3571 5238 4717 3166 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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6.3 Firm Attributes 
Managerial perceptions on constraints on growth do not appear to differ; yet 
we know that there was a systematic change in exporting behavior following the crisis. 
Returning to the full SI dataset, we try to distinguish those firms that continued to 
export post-crisis from those that did not in terms of characteristics rather than 
managers’ perceptions. Although we cannot identify the constraints on exporting, one 
might reasonably expect that “better” firms would be must likely to overcome 
whatever constraints do exist. This notion is consistent with the hypothesis in Bernard 
(1999) that more capable firms are able to mitigate barriers to entry in export markets 
and that this fact explains the generally higher productivity of exporters. We thus look 
at a number of attributes that might proxy for high managerial talent or advanced 
technology. In particular, we consider foreign ownership, research and development 
expenditures, investment in employee training, and productivity. 
We first examine if these attributes predict post-crisis exporting. Table 1.4 
shows the results of a logit estimation on the sample of pre-crisis exporters that 
survived the crisis. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating post-crisis 
exporting and the coefficients are shown as odds ratios. After controlling for size 
(employees) and industry (2-digit ISIC), we found that firms with pre-crisis foreign 
ownership were 1.53 times more likely than domestic firms to continue exporting. 
Similarly, firms engaged in R&D or making investments in training were, 
respectively, 1.58 and 1.76 times more likely to continue exporting. We also 
calculated a proxy of firm productivity by estimating a translog production function 
for each firm in the pre-crisis years. We normalized each firm’s TFP by the mean of 
its 2-digit ISIC industry, such that a positive number reflected above-mean 
productivity. Surprisingly, however, pre-crisis productivity had no significant effect 
on the odds of firms continuing to export post-crisis. The last column of Table 1.4 
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shows a jointly estimated model with all firm attributes. The results are largely 
unchanged, suggesting that the firm level attributes are somewhat independent and not 
jointly determined. 
Table 1.5 displays the effects of the same attributes on the likelihood of pre-
crisis non-exporters beginning to export post-crisis. The results are very similar to 
those of the estimation for pre-crisis exporters. Foreign firms were 3.98 times more 
likely to start exporting, firms engaged in R&D were 3.35 more times likely, and firms 
investing in training were 2.39 times more likely. In isolation, productivity also 
increases the odds that a firm exporting, although this effect is only marginally 
significant in the jointly estimated model. 
Finally, we ask if firm attributes predict the intensity with which firms export 
post-crisis. Here, we estimate a firm fixed-effect model with log export volume as the 
dependent variable and with year dummy variables to control for time trends. We 
interact each of the attributes described above by a post-crisis dummy to see if the 
attribute had a greater effect on export volume after the crisis than before. In other 
words, we estimate differences in differences model. Table 1.6 displays the results. 
The coefficient of 0.11 on the R&D interaction with post-crisis means that, whatever 
the overall effect of R&D on export volume, that effect was about 11 percent greater 
after the crisis than before it. The results also show that foreign ownership had a more 
positive effect on export volume post crisis. The effect of investments in training is 
insignificant and, surprisingly, productivity has a negative and significant effect. 
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Table 1.5: Likelihood of Pre-Crisis Non-Exporters to Export Post-Crisis 
Dependent Variable:  Post Crisis Exporting  (1/0)    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign Ownership Pre-Crisis 3.984     2.986 
 (7.50)**     (3.83)** 
Productivity  1.750    1.348 
  (4.19)**    (1.90) 
R&D Expenditure   3.353   2.477 
   (11.12)**   (6.05)** 
Engaged in Training Programs    2.388  1.904 
    (7.93)**  (4.62)** 
Total number of employees 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 
 (9.59)** (7.08)** (9.61)** (7.72)** (10.64)** (4.34)** 
Textile and Leather (ISIC 32) 1.887 2.685 2.159 1.935 1.907 2.651 
 (4.11)** (4.95)** (4.95)** (3.93)** (4.18)** (4.47)** 
Wood (ISIC 33) 3.949 5.438 4.186 4.149 3.893 6.216 
 (8.44)** (8.34)** (8.73)** (8.11)** (8.35)** (8.44)** 
Paper  (ISIC 34) 0.656 1.066 0.699 0.534 0.695 0.782 
 (1.23) (0.17) (1.07) (1.58) (1.08) (0.54) 
Chemicals, Coal, Rubber and 
Plastic  (ISIC 35) 
2.027 2.883 1.998 2.067 2.276 2.149 
 (4.01)** (4.87)** (3.94)** (3.78)** (4.72)** (3.18)** 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products  
(ISIC 36) 
0.764 1.004 0.777 0.869 0.771 1.095 
 (1.12) (0.01) (1.04) (0.55) (1.08) (0.31) 
Basic Metal   (ISIC 37) 3.632 4.331 3.815 3.393 4.338 2.896 
 (3.28)** (2.71)** (3.39)** (2.71)** (3.78)** (1.67) 
Fabricated Metal (ISIC 38) 1.745 2.499 1.802 1.689 1.974 2.048 
 (3.13)** (4.15)** (3.34)** (2.67)** (3.87)** (2.97)** 
Other (ISIC 39) 2.012 2.510 2.218 1.689 2.141 2.928 
 (1.94) (1.91) (2.20)* (1.21) (2.12)* (2.19)* 
Observations 16936 10033 16936 15388 16936 8943 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
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Table 1.6: Fixed Effects of Firm-Level Attributes of Pre-Crisis Exporters to 
Continue Exporting Post-Crisis 
Dependant Variable: Log Value of Exported 
Volume     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
R&D Expenditure*Post-Crisis 0.113    0.095 
 (3.22)**    (2.19)* 
Foreign Ownership * Post-Crisis  0.446   0.548 
  (10.66)**   (10.28)** 
Engaged in Training 
Programs*Post-Crisis 
  0.038  0.010 
   (1.07)  (0.23) 
Productivity*Post-Crisis    -0.398 -0.572 
    (7.27)** (9.98)** 
1991 0.068 0.068 0.073 0.120 0.138 
 (1.43) (1.43) (1.51) (2.06)* (2.36)* 
1992 0.221 0.223 0.218 0.270 0.278 
 (4.86)** (4.92)** (4.72)** (4.86)** (4.99)** 
1993 0.345 0.348 0.345 0.414 0.433 
 (7.73)** (7.83)** (7.60)** (7.57)** (7.90)** 
1994 0.462 0.467 0.463 0.562 0.578 
 (10.45)** (10.62)** (10.31)** (10.42)** (10.68)** 
1995 0.464 0.470 0.461 0.561 0.570 
 (10.67)** (10.86)** (10.44)** (10.56)** (10.70)** 
1996 0.554 0.560 0.539 0.673 0.672 
 (13.05)** (13.24)** (12.49)** (12.88)** (12.82)** 
1999 0.662 0.619 0.669 0.885 0.768 
 (14.69)** (14.17)** (13.44)** (16.34)** (12.45)** 
2000 0.621 0.576 0.625 0.860 0.729 
 (14.00)** (13.40)** (12.78)** (16.10)** (11.94)** 
No. of Establishments 13035 13035 12409 8953 8526 
R-squared 
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.09 
Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses      
* significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%      
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This paper asks two questions. First, how did firm exporting behavior change 
in response to the devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah? Second, if firms vary in their 
response to the devaluation, can firms’ perception of constraints or managerial 
attributes predict the varied response? 
Our results for the first question show that the rate of entry and exit to and 
from export markets increased dramatically following the devaluation. Consistent with 
trade theory predictions for better terms of trade, many firms were able to take 
advantage of export opportunities. More puzzling however, is the finding that a large 
number of pre-crisis exporters quit exporting even in the presence of a much more 
advantageous exchange rate. In total, the absence of an export boom cannot be 
attributed to lack of entrepreneurial ambition or activity amongst would-be exporters. 
Rather, the absence of a boom is the result of some constraint that prohibited many 
pre-crisis exporters from continuing. 
Our results for the second question are less definitive. Using a detailed survey 
of a sub-sample of firms, we are unable to detect any noticeable differences in the 
constraints perceived by firms that continued to export and firms that stopped 
exporting. We are unable to determine if this result is due to an insufficient sample 
size or other methodological issues, or due to the true constraints not being included in 
the survey. When we look at the full sample of firms, we do find some firm attributes 
that partly explain differences in post-crisis exporting. Foreign firms, firms engaged in 
R&D, and firms investing in training were all most likely to continue to export post-
crisis. 
Our results describe the firm attributes that were associated with post-crisis 
export-driven growth. At the same time however, the reason that so many firms left 
export markets in the presence of improved terms of trade remains a mystery. We 
hope that further research will provide richer answers to this important question. 
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Agricultural Biotechnology Risks and Economic Development: 
A Call for a Public-Private Partnerships to Stimulate Investments into African 
Biotechnology Industries 
Abstract 
 
What makes or breaks the decision for an MNC to enter an emerging market beyond 
incentives for profit-maximization? What role exist for public-private partnerships as a 
mechanism for value capture in agricultural biotechnology investments into uncertain 
markets? The objective of the paper is to provide the necessary theoretical framework 
by which future research may empirically assess the discounted value and probability 
of R&D investments into the African agricultural biotechnology sector. A partnership 
model lies at the foundation for creating marketing channels between industries with 
high fixed costs and high social utility value. Stimulating intellectual and scientific 
investments in agricultural biotechnology are contingent on prioritization of public 
policy, wherein optimal investment strategy into developing markets becomes a 
balance between providing adequate incentives for investment without compensating 
technological dissemination to smallholders. A strong regulatory environment not only 
ensures market power for the private industry and but forces change in the general 
expectations from and attitude towards the hybrid seed and agriculture innovation. It 
is, additionally, imperative to create a linkage between the private sector and the 
smallholder. Not only are multinationals currently the gatekeepers of intellectual 
capacity for agricultural biotechnology research, but also possess capacity to enter the 
market and provide products en masses. The lack of immediate profit incentives may 
be balanced by public sector partnerships that might cushion risks and eventually 
expand market opportunities for the smallholder.  
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Section 1: Introduction: The Modern Seed Industry and Globalization 
This paper was prompted by the question, “what is the influence of foreign 
direct investments in the seed industry in emerging countries?” Organization of the 
private seed sector has been characterized by firm consolidation and a shift away from 
purely agrochemical research into a world of high risk ventures in seed genomics. The 
implications for the structure of the industry challenged the central assumption in the 
questions stated above. That is, the central question was not so much a 
characterization of FDI in the seed sector, but rather which development strategies 
can by-pass obstacles of incomplete markets while stimulating economic growth? 
Effective public policy has been touted as the best method of stimulating foreign 
investments in high cost, high risk projects in areas in need of agricultural R&D.  
Research on the agricultural seed industry in developing countries is vast and 
has focused on the effects of strategic pricing behavior on competitive structures as a 
result of monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies of the seed biotech sector and, 
access to seeds by farmers through market mechanisms as a result of market changes. 
Generally, these studies have centered on how the factors influence product, process 
and institutional innovation (Speilman, 2003). Product research investigates 
improvements in cultivar varieties and productivity enhancements as a result of 
genetic improvements; process research accounts for cultivar methodologies, from 
plant breeding and selection through to genetic engineering.  
Research on institutional innovation focuses on the social, economic and 
political relationship between the private and public sectors, agriculturalists and 
rural/urban consumer and will be the focus of this essay. The scope of research in this 
field has accounted for allocation mechanisms of R&D investments between public 
agents and the farmer or co-op and has followed the lifecycle of product development: 
addressing innovation channels, postulating on avenues for market introduction, 
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acceptance, market growth and, finally, how to deal with obsolescence of a technology 
or process. 
What has yet to be determined in agricultural development is how to best 
address “institutional innovation” in the presence of market failures. For the sake of 
example, let’s consider a small-scale South African farmer in a village in Kwazulu-
Natal. For him to simply participate in local markets, he needs to contend with a mode 
and method of transportation from his farm to the local market since interstate 
roadways have yet to be developed to the extent of connected the vast majority of 
scatter, rural villages to major towns. He also needs to address savings to buy seeds 
and invest in marketing his product, a stable and healthy supply of labor and weather. 
Idealistically biotechnology has endless potential for small-scale farmers to address 
only some of the issues. However, questions of how the farmer that would best benefit 
from this technology can afford to buy GMO seeds or maintain communications with 
extension specialists is still being investigated.  
The research presented in this essay will address the following research question: 
What public policy measures can best take advantage of the innovations in 
biotechnology to spur agricultural development in low-income countries, given the 
high risk, high cost and low-returns of these projects? 
Innovations in effective irrigation, crop protection and yield have traditionally 
been at the forefront of economic development policy. Although most of the industrial 
world relies less on the agricultural sector as carrying the burden of leading and being 
a proxy for economy-wide health, agriculture is the most important economic sector in 
most of the developing world. Productivity gains have been stalled from regional-
specific diseases, environmental factors and ineffective techniques. Biotechnology has 
played a role in ameliorating some of the issues faced by the smallholder by creating 
solutions for many of these problems through gene manipulation and seed 
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development. The technology undoubtedly holds promising solutions to benefit 
agriculture based economies. However, many countries have been hesitant in 
promoting research into biotech foods and crops for fear of loosing important external 
markets and general lack of information on the long-term health and environmental 
implications from genetic engineering. Biosafety policies are harmonized with the 
viewpoint that biotechnology will improve the economic base of the exporting country 
as well as encourage improved resource use (Herity, 2003). American and Canadian 
producers face less aversion to GMOs due to commercial opportunities to internal 
markets and environmental benefits that reduce production costs. In contrast, early in 
the 21st century, the European Union had in place a moratorium on importing any 
genetically modified products. From a strictly economic perspective, the production 
gains in North America by the use of biotechnology has the potential for flooding the 
EU market. As such, the Nuffield Council is perceived as a trade barrier rather than an 
ethical protest. African countries that begin to use crop biotechnology are in jeopardy 
of losing many EU consumers (BFTW, 2002). As a result of market threats from 
adopting biotechnology, there are many commercially and food security driven 
countries that are averse to adopting GMO technology. Zambia is an example of a 
country searching for food security and income generation opportunities yet will not 
adopt biotech policies in fear of losing the EU market. As a country frequented by 
droughts, floods and breaks in the supply chain due to weak infrastructure, Zambian 
farmers are restricted to certified maize and some vegetable seed varieties and tend to 
rely on farm-saved seed. Improved seed varieties and complementary inputs remain 
artificially high due to bureaucratic misconceptions on returns from improved seed 
varieties, limiting both production and sales of improves seed varieties (Muliokela, 
2004). Agricultural productivity and household food security in Zambia is limited to 
improving seed production, as opposed to increasing cultivated land area, as well as 
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improving national seed distribution system. In the case of Zambia, seed certification 
programs have been developed to protect farmer varieties and lower transaction costs 
within the market. Also, there has been general government support and investment to 
initial seed sector development (Muliokela, 2004). Ultimately, the promise for 
improved productivity and general stability overshadows ethical doubts of the science. 
Contrary to a public-sector driven research sector in the past, today the private sector 
hold the best resources to devote to research and development (R&D). With changes 
to the industrial structure of the sector, larger firms have an opportunity to invest in 
risky projects, such as regional specific crop diseases. At the same time, larger firms 
are driven by shareholder expectations and thus, evaluate projects based on profit 
margins which necessarily excludes many agricultural genomic research aimed at 
developing countries. Smaller seed research facilities are often inadequate to address 
genomic research questions. It is currently difficult to attract necessary investments 
into the commercial research and development sector for regional-specific diseases 
due to perceived and actual low market returns for these investments, distribution 
challenges in countries with poor market infrastructure and lack of awareness for 
agricultural research oriented in developing countries. Parallel importing and 
compulsory licensing have also created disincentives for future investments. Finally, 
the high fixed costs of conducting research often precludes the ability to offer these 
technologies at low-cost for the smallholder. In the end, the farmer who will end up 
using the seeds are cultivating to serve local food needs. Hence, the issue becomes one 
of creating affordable access to hybrid seeds without compensating incentives (i.e. 
returns on investment) to invest in such opportunities.  
The essay attempts to address to question of how to improve incentives to 
invest in seed genomic research in African countries by synthesizing information from 
related sectors, such as pharmaceutical and information technology and other 
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industries similar to the organization structure of the biotechnology industry. The 
findings reiterate that it is insufficient to simply reiterate the role of the public and 
private sector in disseminating productivity-enhancing technology and poverty 
reducing strategies. Rather, the gap between potential for investments and probability 
for returns on investment are a function of two elements: an appropriate economic 
model and public-private partnerships modeled after successful ventures in the AIDS 
and Tuberculosis research sectors. I propose that research be invested in the potential 
for real options theory as a method for better articulating the extent to which 
investments will be of value to its stakeholders and affected by technical uncertainty, 
regulatory uncertainty and scientific uncertainty. In an industry characterized by high-
costs, support for venture capital markets through public-private partnerships is 
unequivocally the best public policy instrument because it bridges institutions to 
address transaction costs and risks. The essay introduces the next step: a best practice 
model based on the work of the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development.  
In Section 2, the state of the seed biotech industry will be characterized with 
respect to it’s private and public sector structure in 2005 and public policy framework. 
The current industrial structure will be described and put into context with the 
Schumpeterian model of innovations (Section 2.1). In light of a consolidated industry, 
the need for effective patent laws will be discussed as a tool for harnessing research 
for application to problems in developing countries (Section 2.2). The role of public 
sector will be presented (Section 2.3) and then partnership potential between the 
public-private will be explored (Section 2.4). The best practice model will be 
discussed in Section 3 and the economic model will be presented in Section 4 and 
applied in an example to investments in the Kenyan seed industry (Section 4.1). 
Section 5 concludes with policy recommendations and future research goals. 
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Section 2: Review of Literature 
Section 2.1: Industrial Organization of the Agricultural Biotechnology Sector 
Previous literature in this field has reiterated the ability of the private seed 
industry to fostering well-developed market structures in countries where 
multinational corporations (MNCs) decide to invest and it’s role in advocating and 
initiating the process of developing a system of intellectual property in the country’s 
public policy system. The trend towards consolidation (discussed in greater detail 
below) has in some respects “synergized” research capabilities with local start-ups and 
public firms, has allowed for economies of scale and scope to override fixed costs 
associated with the R&D costs idiosyncratic with the biotech industry. The primary 
source of genetically modified (GM) crops today is the private sector (Sithole-Niang, 
2004). Thus, many economists have advocated a pure private sector approach to 
accelerating technological growth in the developing world because the private sector 
offers the best opportunities for technology transfers and commercialization (Barton 
(2004), Martin, S and Scott, J (2000)). The private sector can import technologies with 
greater efficiency due to differing goals. As opposed to pure research goals, there are 
factors such as profitability and cost-efficiency that improve the selection process of 
various investment opportunities (Wagner, 1999). Currently, the international seed 
industry has been the largest investor of seed research in commodity-export oriented 
countries, such as Brazil and Argentina (Table 2.1). Most field trails of new 
biotechnologies are conducted by private MNCs (Pray, 1999).  
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Table 2.1: World Research Agreements in Agrobiotechnology, 1996-2000 (Echeverria 
et al, 2001) 
Company  Research Area (year) Contract Value 
AgrEvo (GeneLogic) Disease Resistence (1998) $ 45 million 
Bayer (Arqule) Library Screening (1999) $30 million 
American Cyanamid 
(Hyseq) 
Genomics (1999) $60 million 
 
The pubic policy emphasis on promoting private sector growth in the seed 
industry is a departure from the rhetoric that drove success in Southeast Asia during 
The Green Revolution. During the 1960s and 1970s, introduction of improved and 
modern variety of seeds was possible with a well integrated institutional system. 
Appropriate resource management techniques and introducing complementary inputs, 
dramatically increased agricultural productivity and stimulated economic growth 
within a span of 20 years (World Bank, 2003). The public sector influence resulted in 
a public goods nature of agricultural R&D. Institutions were able to manage costs and 
risks of long-term projects in areas with high degrees of uncertainty and allow of 
wider dissemination of knowledge through a vertically integrated system via an 
enabling public policy regime (Byerlee et al, 2002).  A decade ago, the commercial 
seed industry was highly concentrated in industrialized countries, with a calculated 
global seed market of $50 billion (US). The Erosion, Technology and Concentration 
(ETC) Group estimates that the top 10 seed industries in 2003 controls $23,000 
millions worth of the commercial seed market and accounts for 31% of commercial 
seed sales (ETC, 2003). Most MNC concentration is evident in the largest food crops, 
such as maize and soybean. In 2003, the global market value of GM crops is estimated 
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to be $4.50 to $4.75 billion ($4.0 billion in 2002). This value for 2003 represents 15% 
of the $31 billion global crop protection market, and 13% of the $30 billion global 
commercial seed market. However, for maize alone, four companies control over 
three-quarters of the commercial seed market (ETC, 2003). For 2005, the global value 
of the GM crop market is projected to be at least $5 million, with over 67.7 million 
acres devoted exclusively to transgenic crops in 18 countries (Davis, 2004).  
As the empirical evidence suggests, the biotechnology market is dominated by 
few firms with significant market power. Mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances 
are typically between large and established firms and, technology start-up companies 
(Table 2.2). According to the Economic Research Service of the USDA, Monsanto 
best exemplified the trend towards consolidation and led the fundamental shift in the 
industry focus from agrochemicals and fertilizers into genetics and life sciences. 
Between 1996 and 1998, Monsanto acquired a biotech company (Calgene) and 
numerous seed companies (Asgrow, Corn States Hybrid, DeKalb Genetics, Holden’s 
Foundation Seed, the Plant Breeding Institute Cambridge, Sementes Agroceres and 
Gargill’s foreign seed business). Are biotech investments adequate methods of 
stimulating industrial development? The US Federal Trade Commission assesses 
industry competitiveness in terms of impact on innovative capacity (Giannakas et al., 
2001). Indeed forward and backward integration not only by-pass transaction costs of 
entering risky markets and initiating field tests, but leads to commercialization of plant 
biotechnology (Bijman, 2001). Brennan et al. (2001) found that MNC concentration in 
the US biotech sector was complementary for corn- and cotton-related patents, but 
substitutes for soybean. It must be noted that multinational seed companies are able to 
improve overall efficiency and competitive advantage of the sector. Vertical 
integration with smaller firms still in phase 1 of a research project, however do not 
generate profits because they are unable to attain economies of scale and scope with 
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respect to most aspects of the product pipeline (i.e. plant breeding, variety registration 
and marketing). 
 
Table 2.2: Top 10 Seed Companies Active in Research and Development (ETC, 2003) 
Seed Company (country of origin) 2002 Global Seed Sales  
(US millions) 
1. Du Pont/ Pioneer (US)  $2,000 
2. Monsanto/Pharmacia (US)  $1,600 
3. Syngenta (Switzerland)  $937 
4. Seminis (US)  $453 
5. Advanta (Netherlands)  $435 
6. Group Limagrain (Vilmorin Clause) 
(France) 
 $433 
7. KWS AG (Germany)  $391 
8. Sakata (Japan)  $376 
9. Delta & Pine Land (US)  $258 
10. Bayer Crop Science (Germany)  $250 
 
Market structure is invariably a determining factor to the success of a firm in 
an R&D race, in addition to public sector R&D and intellectual property rights. 
Phillips (1971) suggested that the market structure of R&D influences the market 
downstream. The gains realized by smaller, local seed companies in developing 
regions are largely afforded in terms of increased research capacity and ability to 
avoid the fixed costs of the R&D process through market imperfections, such as 
knowledge spillovers (Alex et al., 2002). The late Schumpeter model from Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (1975) will serve as the theoretical basis from which the 
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current agricultural biotechnology seed sector will be evaluated. Unlike Schumpeter’s 
earlier theory, where technological advances are characterized by constant entry and 
regeneration by innovative firms causing displacements of “out-dated” firms, his later 
model introduced the concept of barriers to entry. For example, as mentioned earlier, 
the agrobiotech industry is characterized by high fixed costs and potentially high 
profits for patent-holders of a specific technology. The uncertainty of successful 
product development is balanced by the potential of certain market power and 
corresponding existence of economics of scale from this “winner takes all”-patent-
based specialization in innovative processes. Larger firms with greater technological 
resources and market power enjoyed positions of static power. These firms would then 
use this market advantage to finance risky, large-scale R&D activity and leave society 
better off (Martin S. and Scott, J, 2000). However, the game is not lost for those who 
do not finish first-as ‘creative destruction’ implies: the sole holder of a technology is 
bound to be imitated or superceded by another-better- innovation. Research on 
Schumpeter’s model of technological change in non-competitive market conditions is 
exhaustive and appropriate from which to view the current high-tech agricultural 
market because it is an industry where risk is inherent in the research, development 
and commercialization process. Supporting Schumpeterian views on innovation, 
Brennan et al (2001) show that market concentration in the US biotechnology industry 
could increase appropriability, that is the opportunity to bring a product from concept 
to market. Success could increase R&D intensity in the forms of economies of scale 
and scope. For example, Baker (1998) suggests that monopolization in Aspen skiing 
resorts or Kodak actually encouraged fringe innovation in some industries by 
increasing the expected payoff to such innovation without reducing the incentives for 
dominant firms to innovate. Hayenga (1998) stresses that there is currently insufficient 
evidence of price setting by mature firms in oligopolistic seed industries. As a result of 
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concentrating their research and marketing resources, the end-user gains from high 
productivity and efficiency gains (Thayer, 2002). Martin (1998) suggests that product-
market competition will reduce expected profits before and after innovation but, 
reduces pre-innovation profit relatively more and this increases private incentives to 
invest in innovation. As the concentration of firms active in innovative activities 
increases, competitive pressure will reduce incentives to innovate in the industry, as a 
whole. Specifically, risk aversion may increase with increased concentration, and 
crowd out the smaller entrepreneurs, who are potential risk takers and sources of 
innovation. Ahn (2002) also summarizes the effects of market power as an issue 
between the expectations of ex post market power as an incentive to invest and ex ante 
market power as a means of reducing uncertainty associated with excessive rivalry. 
There does exist a “two-tiered” structure by which a dynamic relationship exists; the 
yet to be profitable start-up that pioneer research of biotech processes pertinent to 
regional agricultural issues and the multinational which is typically a late-comer into 
the market. Although static competition might appear almost non-existent, the 
expectations of short-run market power is a necessary condition for dynamic 
competition. Industry concentration serves as an incentive for expansion by spreading 
the sunk costs of basic research (Breenan et al, 2001). Ultimately, the limited 
empirical research does not resolve any questions regarding the relationship between 
concentration and R&D activity (Oehmke, 2001). A strict reliance on market 
structures can result in underinvestment in innovative processes due to limited 
appropriability from the market as a whole, limited knowledge spillovers or 
monopolization of government infrastructure: each of these elements overrides the 
potential for consumer surplus as a result of market power (Martin, S and Scott, J, 
2000). However, profits from market powers can also provide firms with leverage to 
innovate despite inefficient markets. This is the most powerful argument for private 
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sector expansion in agrobiotech industries. The inability for local seed companies to 
gain access to complementary inputs such as the presence of credit institutions, 
distribution mechanisms (marketing programs) and opportunities for bureaucratic 
collaborations with the private sector is largely driven by the presence of monopolistic 
industries that capture rents, overestimating managerial effort and leading to greater 
market inefficiencies (ETC, 2003). Madhok (2002) suggests that the extent of 
influence of innovations to incumbent firms in the agrobiotech industry is influenced 
by home country embedded-ness of technology creation and absorptive capacity for 
commercialization. The general positive spillovers from technology transfers may be 
adversely affected by higher market prices upon entry of MNCs through strategic 
alliances with strong local firms. As the trend towards privatization in the seed 
industry continues to be predominated by large multinational seed industries, the 
exclusive rights to the market leads directly to a strong market position. Naturally, 
value placed on technology as a result of exclusively further drives up the market 
value, despite regulatory cushions or consumer uncertainty. 
With new models of market structure and competition, the case for strict 
market power is no longer sufficient. Similar to Schumpeter’s earliest model of 
innovation, new entrants have the potential to aggressively experiment with new 
technology because they are not overburdened by corporate goals and large 
management structures. The smaller, goal-oriented firm may actually be a driving 
force for innovations and also forced to innovate themselves (Ahn, 2002). Garcia and 
Velasco, 2002 studied the European biotechnology industry and introduced the dyadic 
notion of competition and cooperation (“co-opetition”), where strategy is a function of 
industrial relationships rather than structure. Specifically, co-opetition occurs when 2 
firms form a strategic alliance and trust towards a common goal, yet compete in other 
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aspects. This notion extends to the shifting political mind-frame of the 21st century ag-
biotech venture capitalist. 
Competitive pressure will always be the most reliable free-market mechanism 
of checks and balances, with the power to stimulate innovative activity, consumer 
surplus, firms are more apt to increasing productive efficiencies so as to secure rents 
that better reflect marginal gains in productivity (Ahn, 2002). Competition is 
conducive to Darwinian innovation and growth or a ‘neck-and-neck effect’, forcing 
firms to speed up adoption of new technologies and innovate to survive. In high-tech 
industries in emerging economies, product market competition is more common, since 
it is characterized by as a market of substitutability between new and old production 
methods.  
Section 2.2: Why Plant Property Rights Have Come to Matter 
Grossman et al. (1991) argues that biotech companies with vested interests in 
agricultural inputs and trade enter the seed industry to diversify their activities. It is the 
existence of intellectual property laws that guarantee exclusive rights over 
technologies, and as such remains the source of barriers to entry and decisive factor of 
taking risks in a potential market: market power becomes a reality with a system of 
property laws. Intellectual property rights in the form of patents have greatly 
influenced MNC strategies on investing and controlling dissemination of proprietary 
knowledge. Plant technology is, naturally, a biotech MNC’s main commercial asset 
and is used to guarantee a continuous stream of income after years of R&D. It is the 
prospect for recuperating the start-up costs from licensing patents which stimulates the 
financial investment in new technologies and attracts new investors.  
Fifteen years ago, Vitamin A deficiency afflicted nearly 400 million of the 
world’s population, of which a quarter were children. Without Vitamin A, children 
develop partial to complete blindness, respiratory problems and diarrhea (Sommer, 
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1990). For the poor, the majority of caloric requirements are from rice grains, a food 
without beta-carotene, the precursor to Vitamin A. So, Swiss scientists introduced 3 
genes: two from daffodils and one from a bacterium that produces beta-carotene 
(giving the rice it’s golden color) with the ultimate goal of transferring the genetic 
materials to local varieties of rice in developing countries (Khush, 2004).  
Unfortunately, golden rice not only used 70 different patented materials, but 
these rights belonged to 32 different entities (countries and universities). How can 
golden rice reach the poorest farmers free of restriction? In the end, the inventors were 
able to circumvent the IPR issues by issuing the technology under the general 
principle of “technology for humanitarian purposes” sponsored by Syngenta. 
Humanitarian use mandated that Golden Rice be made available to resource poor 
farmers who make less than US$10,000 per years. Humanitarian license terms allowed 
the inventors to secure rights from several companies, without forsaking commercial 
rights and possibilities. To date, the Philippines, India, China, Vietnam and Indonesia 
have secured licenses to Golden Rice. Although this case is an illustration of one of 
the first successful public-private sector partnership, it also shows that tapping into the 
genetic potential of a crop variety afflicted with disease and productivity hurdles is not 
a simple matter of R&D development and marketing. The use of proprietary 
technologies might cause costly inventions to never reach the end-user either because 
of costs of ownership or limitations to commercialization. Golden Rice was a rare case 
of socially-conscious inventors and effective legal resources to avoid patent hassles 
after the fact. It reflects that if an invention is sure to benefit a large mass of people 
around the world, duty might (and in this case, did) supercede pure profit-motives. In 
most cases, this framework will not apply, especially when research has not reached 
the development stage due to costs impediments or without a clear profit margin as a 
result of appropriation.  
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The hybrid seed industry’s market security is directly related to changes in 
intellectual property rights (Barton, 2004). Hybrid seeds are valued for commercial 
gains from significantly higher yields and, proprietary incentives are a necessary 
mechanism encouraging innovation and R&D. For most hybrid seeds, however, there 
is an added barrier of protection as many seeds do not breed true-to-type offspring. In 
cases where ‘biological’ protection is non-existent, Plant Breeder’s Rights have been 
adopted in most countries under the provision of the international Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) as a uniform system for variety 
protection and quality control in industrialized nations. Without UPOV laws, a 
breeding parent can be a genetically altered variety (i.e. a plant where a specific gene 
has been introduced artificially). A competitor can legitimately transfer this gene by 
cross breeding and market the resultant variety as his own, with the gene originally 
discovered in the breeding parent. Without laws that account for such occurrences and 
protecting the transformed gene, a breeder would be less likely to discover genes, 
create trangenic seed varieties and introduce them into the market (Barton, 2004). 
Once novel and useful inventions of processes are patented, the ability to capitalize on 
patents is highly dependent on mechanism of patent and intellectual property 
protection (Nuffield Council, 2004). Without divulging into patent law, holding a 
patent gives the owner full control over who may obtain a license for use of the 
technology for a given period of time. UPOV is largely viewed as the most effective 
framework for legislative positioning. Aside from the obligations established under the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement of the WTO, 
underdeveloped frameworks threatens cut-offs from biotech investment opportunities 
and access to proprietary knowledge that fail to go beyond the provisions guaranteed 
by UPOV. UPOV serves only as a necessary guideline for clarifications and 
limitations on patent law legislation and is certainly not sufficient. 
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UPOV 1978 initially outlined 3 criteria for varietals protection afforded to 
plant breeders:1. Distinctiveness1 2. Uniformity and, 3. Stability 2. For example, 
consider a transgenic insect resistant variety. Ownership at stake includes: rights for 
the germplasm, 2 patents for the selectable marker gene, 2 patents for the trait to be 
incorporated, 1 patent for the transformation technology, and 2 patents for the gene 
expression technology (Bijman, 2001). A patent holder may then license the rights to a 
germplasm with no obligation to license the corresponding technologies it owns. The 
classic case illustrating the potential insufficiencies of UPOV is that of Agracetus3, the 
first to obtain patent protection for the genetic engineering of cotton plants and 
transgenic soybreans (Bijman, 2001). The broad nature of the patent protected both the 
transgenic plant and the technology, implying that Agracetus would have exclusive 
rights to all transgenic soybeans and cotton plants, regardless of technological 
methods and thus, tremendous commercial power. 
The current verison of UPOV viz. UPOV 1991 added ‘new’ to the description, 
to complete the description of plant patents to be “new” and “distinct”. The newest 
amendments also broadened coverage of patent laws to cover plant varieties of all 
taxa. UPOV 1991 gives an option to national governments to prevent farmers from the 
privilege of retaining or re-using seeds for self cultivation. In other words, the breeder 
of a cosmetically bred variety would have to buy genetic dependency rights from the 
derived variety prior to commercializing the derived version. 
                                                 
 1By distinctness, the UPOV means a variety of plant which is ‘clearly distinguishable 
from other varieties whose existence is a matter of common knowledge’ 
 2Relevant characteristics of protected plant variety remain unchanged either for a 
specified period or after repeated propagations or cycles of propagations’ 
 3Agracetus is now owned by Monsanto 
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IPR policy plays a crucial role in agricultural investments as a signal for a 
market where risk taking behavior will payoff.. Low discount public funds for plant 
breeding has induced countries like India to develop policies modeled after UPOV , 
based on the implicit assumption that private funds for R&D in plant breeding will 
‘crowd in.’  
Further, technology licensing agreements complements the development of an 
oligopolisitc, yet globalized marketplace. Licensing allows a firm to maintain market 
power and control over their innovative processes while minimizing the potential start-
up costs of market development (Bessey et al., 2002). As an intermediate form of 
knowledge transfer, licensing ultimately has the benefit of affiliation with established 
local partners and less investment risk (Krattiger, 2002). Not only are intellectual 
property rights used as a mechanism of market protection but, it increases exporter 
liability to infringe on foreign IPR. Barton (2004) suggests that with effective laws, 
IPR can be beneficial in creating location-based trademarks in developing countries, 
where geographic indicators can be used as product identification and differentiation 
signaling quality and trust. IPR regimes play a key role in influencing the evolution of 
innovations (discussed in detail in Section 4). Arguably, patent laws that protect the 
seed investor from gene discovery, transformation and any transformed plants with the 
patented gene are needed. Such laws also facilitate commercialization of varieties 
developed in the public sector.  
Barton (2004) however, suggests that IPR has differential effects on research 
between ornamental, horticultural and field crop varieties. That is, for crops such as 
wheat where hybrids are generally not used, IPR creates very little inventive for 
additional R&D as opposed to maize where IPR is a necessary form of protection 
(Barton, 2004). In many ways complying to protection laws are cost prohibitive for 
local seed firms. Tripp (2003) claims that seed sector regulation is not a prerequisite 
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for seed system development because regulation can actually be perceived by farmers 
and smallholders as a hindrance to production development. The cost of obtaining 
regulatory clearance for crops, such as Bt maize, that are registered in the main export 
markets range between $7 to 15 million dollars (De Greef, 2004).  
Gravel et al (2004) considers a similar industry, the electricity power grid 
investment, and suggests that for irreversable investment decisions lengthy and costly 
regulatory review processes increases market uncertainty-regulators should strive 
towards predictable, fair and short processes. Currently, many sub-Saharan countries 
insist on food crop certification process which remains a cost prohibitive for smaller 
seed companies and a time cost to larger firms. De Greef (2004) expands upon the 
prohibitive nature of international regulatory services for the public goods sector. 
Most regulatory compliance work for large-scale, commerical agrobiotech projects are 
in-house for companies with the legal and administrative capacity.  
The most viable options for accessing proprietary technologies include 
unilaterally accessing technologies, purchasing it and material transfer and, licensing 
agreements (Khush, 2002). The first of the three options merely suggests that it would 
be legal for the public sector to copy a technology without seeking permission from 
the owner if the patent for the technology has not been lodged in a country where it is 
used or exported to a country where the technology is protected. This option is most 
seen in countries with fragile national agricultural research systems and ill-defined 
regulatory frameworks.  
The purchasing option is most viable for situations where knowhow exists in 
the private sector of a technology which would be of social benefit, but market 
uncertainty impedes private sector development of the technology. The International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) which purchased the rights to Bt gene owned by a 
Japanese firm, Planttech, made the rights to the gene publicly available subject to 
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royalty costs. Similar scenarios have also played out in Latin American national 
agricultural research centers. Khush (2002) suggests that a contract to participate in a 
agricultural development process in exchange for retaining ownership of the product 
with the private sector via a competitive bidding option would be a viable strategy in 
situations when development of products that would otherwise not go into product 
development due lack of foreseeable profit-motives could materialize. 
Currently, material transfer and licensing agreements (MTA) are favored due 
to minimal upfront costs and lowered risks because negotiation for the use of the 
product occurs after the value of the product is fully known. However, MTAs are 
usually limited to use for the research phase, leaving legalities and development for 
commercial use to a later stage. Also, since the success rate of the product is known, 
the higher expectations on returns to investment lead to higher costs. The prospects of 
gaining first-mover advantages with such technology is an especially fruitful strategy 
in economies that have yet to be introduced to innovative products. MNCs 
successfully capture and secure profits since farmers must return year after year to 
procure new seeds from the seed marketer to sustain his new found high yield output.  
Hence, the extent of and conditions for seed demand are factors to consider 
from the production side; improved technologies are far superior in yield capacity than 
traditional landraces, especially for hybrid seeds capable of increased yield under 
limited availability of water and certain management practices (Maunder, 2000). 
Although hybrid seeds have been widely adopted by small-scale farmers in markets 
where price controls have kept seed-to-grain prices low, farmers are far more willing 
to forgo controlled pricing and willing to pay as much as double for seed from an 
MNC with the reputation and assurance for quality seeds. Hence, one might argue that 
intellectual property rights with provisions for material transfer and licensing 
agreements will not only favor of the private industry as a necessary way to encourage 
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innovation and growth, but a valued requirement if effective varieties are to reach the 
African, Asian or Latin American farmer.  
Enforcing and adjusting intellectual property rights policy will not encourage 
additional private sector investment in these countries, as intended, unless there is 
harmonization between biosafety and patent law expectations between countries 
sharing similar agricultural markets. To gain an understanding of the future of 
biotechnology dissemination in the seed industry in developing countries, it is 
imperative to realize the reasons for stronger, progressive and enabling IPR policy. 
Expectations on biosafety are especially important in the agricultural development 
context because of the fragility of the raw materials supply chain and prospects of 
expanding into European and American markets (Nuffield Council, 2004)4. Biosafety 
regulation complements producer-side quality assurances by instilling confidence in 
newer technologies and creating a proxy for the social value of certain technologies 
(Sithole-Niang et al., 2004). Clearly, the priority for regulatory and trade policy with 
respect to stimulating biotech investments in developing nations is the ability to 
improve seed demand, concurrently with the increase effort in the production side 
(Tripp, 2003). Indeed a regulatory environment is a mechanism for accessing 
proprietary technologies by the public sector from the private sector, but legal 
measures also include legal and business options for varietal protection of hybrid 
crops developed by individual farmers and co-ops. For the poorest nations, the 
prospect of patent ownership is worthwhile as an investment catalyst only if there is a 
substantial commercial market for the hybrid variety. While a rigid regulatory 
framework increases the perceived costs and anticipated time to future investment 
projects by increasing time to realize investment projects, the most important 
                                                 
 4The Green Industry Biotechnology Platform is a trade organization promoting 
these concepts of “ethical capital” 
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implication of redefining the proper balance of regulatory systems is the guarantee of 
returns to investment via a compliant market.  
Tripp et al (2000) suggest that quality controls should be shifted ‘downstream’ 
by not only advocating consumer awareness, but also improving capabilities for 
ensuring quality control in the production-side. The current form of regulatory process 
and approval in the seed industry ( in the form of variety registration, seed certification 
and quality control) ensure varietal safety and physical quality. Nonhybrid crops, 
except for vegetables, have had less success as products for opportunity in overseas 
markets (Maunder, 2000). In the case of spring wheat from Dekalb, although over 
50% of the Argetinian market accepted the product it was not as profitable as 
marketing smaller grains in Europe. As a result, a much less risky approach to seed 
introduction has been by way of exports and licensing arrangements with established 
indigenous businesses. For example, Zimbabwe is currently transitioning from a 
public seed sector to a semi-private seed co-op which must start forming technical 
collaborations with U.S., South African, Zambian and Kenyan seed companies 
(Maunder, 2000). Tripp (2003) offers the example of Kenya’s policy for accepting 
Ugandan or Tanzanian varieties that have been tested and approved in their country of 
origin. Of course this idea of policy harmonization is not a peril to seed industry 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. While the US does not have a mandatory variety 
registration or seed certification process, the European Union requires all varieties be 
certified and registered. However, the major difference between the apparent 
divergence of policy scenarios between these industrialized and developing centers is 
the attitude on existence and promotion of voluntary private certification agencies 
(Tripp, 2003). Although the regulatory framework for varietal introduction via the 
private sector is shifting to a more enabling environment, the ability to register and 
release new varieties of seeds is still subject to a tougher approval process compared 
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to the United States (Tripp, 2003). The incentive structure exists in the form of 
marketing reputation of the seed firm and quality of production. Sithole-Niang et al 
(2004) report that the number of approved GM crops in developing countries is largely 
limited to insect-protected cotton due to ease of approval, since cotton is not a food 
crop and thus not subjected to food safety concern at home and for export.  
Section 2.3: The Modern Seed Industry and the Public Sector 
Currently, low purchasing power in a prospective economy in conjunction with 
a highly oligopolistic market sustains barriers to competition for local seed research 
firms and encourages higher price of seeds. New technologies have tended to displace 
those farmers that are unable to afford the agronomic changes needed to meet the 
demands of the growing food industry in most developing nations. Indeed one may 
argue that this simply creates a market where only the most efficient survive, the 
disparity amongst those who ‘survive’ in the market is not necessarily a function of 
true superiority in productivity, but rather access to extension resources. MNCs 
introduce better quality technologies that previously had not existed within the 
economy, however without competition and balance in the market, there are less 
incentives to encourage better technologies and research (Barton, 2004). The public 
sector does maintain the level of competition, participation of the public sector exists 
in a limited capacity, with majority of funding and execution highly dependant on the 
public sector (Falconi, 1999). 
Although most plant genome research occurs in the private sector, there is little 
focus on agricultural production needs in the developing world (Barton, 2004). While 
cereal crops, such as maize, wheat and rice are traded both in domestic and 
international markets, sorghum, barley and millet are cultivated on marginal agro-
ecological land and subject of significantly less R&D expenditure from both foreign 
public and private sectors. The majority of varietals come from local public 
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institutions, such as universities and most commonly national seed and agriculture 
research centers. 
Traditionally farmers produced seeds by saving and selecting seeds for 
planting from the best in their harvest (Grooseman et al., 1991). Until the 1960s, the 
seed industry consisted of small and medium-scale firms and cooperatives serving a 
local and at most a national market (Grossman et al., 1991). The modern seed industry 
has been responsible for agricultural modernization by introducing new hybirds and 
plant breed and seed production techniques. Hybrid seed technology ensures greater 
uniformity and higher yield although at a much higher cost than non-hybrid varieities 
(Groosman et al, 1991). Easy access to genetically altered seeds to the African farmer 
remain ineffective in facilitating dissemination of biotechnology to rural markets due 
to the high cost of the seeds. In 2002, of the 130 million acres of land devoted to GM 
crops, 0.2% was in Africa (Bread for the world, 2002). None of the GMO products in 
2002 specifically addressed the idiosyncrasies of the African agricultural market 
(Table 2.3).  
Seed ventures by the private sector in maize, sorghum, sunflowers and wheat, 
as examples, have been successful in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Thailand. Not 
surprisingly, the beneficial impact of biotechnologies have been on crops of high 
economic importance Crops associated with a lower or not existent comparative 
returns on the world market, yet important in developing regions, have limited the 
potential for attracting research-oriented activities into Africa. Beyond that, the basic 
technologies introduced to the market tend to focus little on regionally important food 
grains and improving agronomic traits such as yield and insect and disease resistance 
(Brennen, 1999).  
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Table 2.3: A Brief Outline of Cultivation Status of Major African Crops 
Crop Subsistence Commercial Market 
Millet √  
Barley √  
Cereal Crops: cultivated in 
smaller quantities on marginal 
agro-ecological land for both 
human and animal 
consumption 
Sorghum √  Cereal Crop: Cultivated in 
industrial countries as hybrids 
Rice √ √ 
Wheat √ √ 
Cereal Crops: Traded on 
domestic and international 
markets, human consumption, 
animal feed 
Maize √ √ Cereal Crop: Cultivated in 
industrial countries as hybrids; 
subjected to most private 
sector R&D expenditure 
Cotton  √ 
Soybean  √ 
Commercial Crop: Extensively 
traded and subjected to major 
private and public R&D 
expenditures. Both are OPVs5 
 
 
In Falconi’s (1999) study of the biotechnology industry in Mexico, Kenya, 
Indonesia and Zimbabwe, each country’s private sector research used mainly less 
advanced and thus, less costly, techniques which are closer to the market than more 
                                                 
 5Open-Pollinated varieties (OPVs) breed true when cross or self-pollinated, i.e. 
retain the expression of their traits. As a result, when cultivated in isolation farmers 
can cultivate new varieties by seed-saving 
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expensive research techniques because of the degree of risk associated with more 
advanced research. For the sake of compensating R&D costs, the most progressive 
research has concentrated on quality concerns of the developed market. Inadequate 
and low levels of research have resulted in lack of high yielding varieties and disease 
resistant varieties pertinent to smallholder needs. Although the private sector is may 
seem irrelevant to meeting the needs of the smallholder, there are opportunities for 
idealistic market exchanges; for example offering GM seeds at marginal cost pricing 
while recouping research expense by selling to large scale farmers at market prices 
(Barton, 2004).  
The public sector, on the other hand, finances around 90% of total agricultural 
research in developing countries (Table 2.4) (Pray and Deininger-Umali, 1998). 
Research capabilities vary between national agricultural research systems (NARS). 
Type 1 NARS posses the capacity in molecular biology to develop new products for 
specific needs (India, China, Mexico and Brazil) whereas Type 2 NARS has the 
capacity to borrow and apply molecular tools (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Colombia, Argentina and Kenya). Most of Africa falls into Type 3 NARS, with simply 
capacity to borrow and apply technologies. It is in the third case where national 
research centers have no regulatory framework in place to even import and test 
transgenic products (Khush, 2002).  
Maunder (2000) well-articulated that the limitations faced by private sector 
development can work only with partnerships with the public sector. Falconi (1999) 
contends that the public sector was always essential as a counterbalance to the private 
industry in the presence of inefficient agricultural market structures. The Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) replaced approximately 60% 
of the rice and wheat for high yielding dwarf varieties during the Green Revolution. It 
was particularly financial investments into seed development in Asian and Latin 
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American countries, rather than importing seeds developed in developed countries, 
that was perceived as the most beneficial form of public investment during the Green 
Revolution. Since the Green Revolution, these national agricultural investments 
centers have grown at tremendous rates in the emerging economies such as Brazil and 
China. These institutions provide an international network of field experts, conduits 
between farmers and technology by addressing all biotic and abiotic production 
constraints and guiding programs that maximize public benefits from technological 
innovations in agriculture (Barton, 2004). Varieties developed in the public sector can 
also be introduced to the market at competitive prices compared to the private sector 
varieties. Public sector assets also include a wide range of evaluation networks, 
expertise in breeding, familiarity with local growing conditions and access to seed 
delivery systems. However, Wheeler and Berkley (2001) identified transparency and 
public scrutiny at the public sector level as the deciding factor in a successful 
partnership. 
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Table 2.4: Research Trends in Selected African Countries (Brink et al, 2001) 
Country Area of Research 
Kenya  
Production of disease free plants and micropropagation of pyrethrum, 
bananas, potatoes, strawberries, sweet potato, citrus, sugar cane 
Micropropagation of ornamentals (carnation, alstromeria, gerbera, 
anthurium, leopard orchids) and forest trees 
In vitro selection for salt tolerance in finger millet 
Transformation of tobacco, tomato and beans 
Transformation of sweet potato with proteinase inhibitor gene 
Transformation of sweet potato with Feathery Mottle Virus, Coat 
protein gene (Monsanto, ISAAA5, USAID6, ABSP7, KARI8) 
Tissue culture regeneration of papaya 
In vitro long term storage of potato and sweet potato 
Marker assisted selection in maize for drought tolerance and insect 
resistance 
Well-established MIRCEN providing microbial biofertilizers in the 
East African region 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Country Area of Research 
South Africa 
Genetic engineering 
- Cereals: maize, wheat, barley, sorghum, millet, soybean, lupins, 
sunflowers, sugarcane 
- Vegetables and ornamentals: potato, tomato, cucurbits, ornamental 
bulbs, cassava and sweet potato 
- Fruits: apricot, strawberry, peach, apple, table grapes, banana 
 Molecular marker applications 
- Diagnostics for pathogen detection 
- Cultivar identification – potatoes, sweet potato, ornamentals, 
cereals, 
cassava 
- Seed-lot purity testing – cereals 
- Marker assisted selection in maize, tomato 
- Markers for disease resistance in wheat, forestry crops 
 Tissue culture 
- Production of disease free plants – potato, sweet potato, cassava, 
dry 
beans, banana, ornamental bulbs 
- Micropropagation of potato, ornamental bulbs, rose rootstocks 
Section 2.4: Public-Private Partnerships in Biotechnology 
Without the private sector, progress made by the public sector in promoting 
cutting-edge research is drastically slowed. Although public-private relationships are 
highly desirable from the perspective of social welfare, there is little incentive for 
private sector participation. Tripp (2003) explains that the public institutional structure 
of the current seed industry in Sub-Saharan Africa makes is even more difficult to 
improve incentives for private sector risk-adversity due to lack of competition, 
acquisition of domestic firms and, complexity of research goals and strategies for the 
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public African agricultural sector (Barton, 2004). Although Brennan et al. (2001) 
suggest that public sector R&D has a relatively quick impact on private sector R&D 
intensity, without the necessary data on the size, structure and content of the public 
sector at a national level, there is very little to support an informed policy decision to 
stimulate private investments (Falconi, 1999).  
As public sector research intends to address smallholder farmer issues by 
adapting technologies developed by the seed industry, it finds itself downstream from 
private sector research (Barton, 2004). Falconi (1999) found that only a few public-
sector research organizations use advanced biotechnology techniques and most local 
start-ups which can potentially enter into strategic alliances with an MNC are only in 
the first states of developing research capacity. As such, only the largest local seed 
companies can exploit research and technological capabilities. 
A partnership between biotechnology firms and research centers in the creation 
of new information and technologies typically works as follows: Research centers 
collaborate as partners with larger biotechnology companies that are able to best 
realize the technical and commercial potential of research findings, i.e. provide risk 
funding for commercially attractive activities that are commercially attractive as 
identified by companies and academics. The partnerships expect collaborating 
companies will ultimately manufacture and distribute the final product. The basic 
incentive to accomplish this is by granting the company exclusive patent rights to the 
product while research centers provide access to the developing world markets. 
Rarely are crop diseases with minimal commercial return are targeted. 
Collaborations between the private and public sectors usually include either private 
firms simply donating technology, institutions building upon existing biotech tools or 
genuine information and knowledge sharing. What are the “best practice” models of 
partnership currently in place where the public sector can maximize their societal 
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goals without compensating the private sector’s responsibilities of living up to 
shareholder expectations on profit margins given investments into product 
development.  
Since the mid-1990s several biotechnology products were introduced to the 
developing countries either through patent agreements facilitated through partnerships 
between the private and public sector. The following are examples of such 
collaborations: 
 
Example 1: Pioneer Hi-Bred and the Agricultural Genetic Engineering Institute 
(AGERI) in Egypt worked together to develop a novel Bt strain that was introduced 
into locally adapted varieties of corn to develop insect resistance in those varieties 
(Khush, 2002). The project itself was funded by the Agricultural Biotechnology 
Support Program (ABSP) of the USAID at Cornell University. This project is a good 
characterization of the extent of investments necessary for high-tech development. 
AGERI scientists had to be trained in order to properly characterize the gene and 
subsequent transformations. The case of unique in that Pioneer was granted access to 
evaluate novel Bt proteins and genes patented by AGERI, i.e. ownership and 
commercialization of transformed maize belonged to the public sector and was made 
available to the private sector for use in the markets they served.  
 
Example 2: In another example where ABSP was the supporting mechanism, 
Syngenta (ICI seeds during the time of the agreement) and the Central Research 
Institute for Food Crops (CRIFC) in Indonesia collaborated to develop tropical maize 
varieties resistant to Asian corn borer. Similar to the AGERI case, Indonesian 
scientists had to be trained on using transformation technologies. This example is used 
to illustrate the challenges encountered by private-public collaborations due lack of 
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knowledge on IPR. In this case, the differences in development and protection 
provided between national laws and lack of legal management capacity in the public 
sector served as a major impediment to negotiating technology transfer agreements. 
Currently, NARS type 2 and 3 lack the knowledge necessary to properly negotiate 
such agreements with the public and private sector. 
 
Example 3: In a project between Monsanto and scientists at the University of Hawaii 
to develop ringspot resistence in papayas, an extensive network throughout Southeast 
Asia was not only developed for the sake of R&D, but included specialists to address 
the impact of the research on income generation, food production, and nutrition 
impacts for resource poor farmers. Moreover, the research scientists were trained 
beyond their areas of specialty to include biosafety, food safety and IPR management. 
In many respects this model was successful; field trails were started in Malaysia and 
Thailand. In this case, it was the regulatory process in many of these countries that 
slowed the development process. Infrastructure problems within the government 
included inadequate staffing and knowledge of existing staff in bureaucratic roles to 
address biotechnology work (Esscaler, 2003).  
 
Example 4: The best example from Africa is the case of virus resistant sweet potato in 
Kenya. The feathery mottle virus (SPFMV) has afflicted production yields throughout 
Africa, with up to 80% yield loss in some parts. In 1999, the ISAAA brokered a 
partnership for the development for SPFMV resistant sweet potato though 
biotechnology. The Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and Monsanto, 
along with research support from ABSP and the Mid-American Consortium formed a 
partnership where Monsanto actually donated a royalty free license to virus resistance 
technology for application to sweet potatoes. Training and internships provided for 
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Kenyan research scientists and the establishment of biosafety structures, IPR protecton 
and technology transfer mechanisms have all helped the GM sweet potato reach 
station trails. Moreover, this project fostered the first field test of a transgenic crop in 
any Eastern and Central African country.  
Section 3: In Search of a Model beyond Agriculture 
Krattiger (2002) describes the decision process of an MNC entering 
international markets as two-tiered. A company must choose between the option of 
exporting goods into a country or producing goods in the target country. Then, the 
company must decide between the option of establishing foreign affiliates or some 
form of local production through joint venture or establishing a firm without a 
strategic alliance. It is most likely a risk-averse MNC chooses a licensing agreement 
through a strategic alliance with a well-established local research entity that has 
enough research capacities to carry out and build upon patented techniques for local 
adaptation. Once this decision is made, however, the firm goes through a sequential 
investment process. 
Once pursuing the decision to market a variety in a partnership scenario, the 
firm automatically subjects itself to incurring upfront costs during the regulatory 
process. Once they enter into the regulatory process, the probability of attaining 
approval is a matter of the perceived social welfare benefits by the regulator. This is a 
function of global perceptions of the biotech project, but also regulations and policy 
that affect the long term flow of net benefits (Gravel, 2004). The longer it takes for the 
approval process to take place, the greater degree of uncertainty for the firm, as it 
becomes more costly to implement the project. Hence, this first step is ultimately 
affected by 1. Completion time for regulatory proceedings 2. Sunk costs to enter 
regulatory process. The best practice partnership addresses the latter of the concerns 
by holding the public institution accountable for the costs of product and market 
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development in the country of interest. Once a firm attains regulatory approval, it 
invests with known sunk start-up cost. The uncertainty in this scenario comes with the 
randomness of project benefits and uncertainty with the irreversibility of the 
investment process (Gravel, 2004).  
Of the various examples of public-private partnership, the “best practice” tends 
to pool the skills and efforts of partner organizations around specific projects with a 
common objective amongst members of the partnership, employs funding from a 
philanthropic organization and involves a for-profit partner. Alternatively, 
partnerships can allow the private company to select amongst a list of pre-selected 
projects to reduce risks of investments and add value.  
Fundamental to these partnerships is creating arrangements where capacity to 
understand and maneuver intellectual property laws are paramount. Apart from 
identifying the feasibility of a project and funding sources, the successful partnerships 
maintain a tight-knit and effective management team that coordinates project selection 
and ensures overhead costs are minimized without forsaking flexible and responsive 
organization (Wheeler, C. and Berkley, S, 2001). 
The best example of this is the current structure of the Global Alliance for TB 
Drug Development. It’s mission and focus is “to accelerate discovery and/or 
development of cost-effective new TB drugs that will: shorten the duration of TB 
treatment or otherwise simplify its completion, improve the treatment of latent TB 
infections and, be effective against multi drug-resistant TB strains.” The decisive 
feature of this organization is that they consider patenting and licensing rights a 
strategic element of project deals. Through past mistakes, ignoring patent law had led 
to devastating costs and in many cases circumvented by evoking humanitarian goals. 
However, the new direction involves using patent law to provide a greater incentive 
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for private sector cooperation by selecting profitable projects and encouraging motives 
for sustainable production.  
How can this be accomplished when targeting low-income markets? 
Companies are compensated for the expected reduced profits in these markets by 
being allowed to profit from more extensive sales of the product in more profitable 
markets or allowing for application of the patented technology to other products. 
These options allow organizations to leverage investments by negotiating to keep 
profit margins as low as possible. Global Alliance outlines various options for 
leveraging IPRs for low profits. The similarities between pharmaceutical markets and 
biotechnology markets include the high cost of the research and development phase, 
regional specific focus of diseases (crop and human), difficulty of low cost distribution 
systems and lastly, the need for patent laws to protect the end product. The differences 
include end-use. Whereas a drug is administered, a hybrid crop or GM product may 
require training in cultivation methods and techniques. Further, the time between 
introduction and market adaptation is longer: the process of field testing to specific 
environments, biosafety and other regulatory processes greatly add to the time 
between investments and realizing returns on investments. Bar-Ilan and Strange 
(1996) refer to model of irreversible investments applicable to projects with a 
“gestation period.” Multinationals require a minimum time frame of 8-10 years to 
develop adapted cultivars to a new market as well as prepare for long-term trial period 
of success (Maunder, 2000). Lastly, the implications of patent laws are more complex 
in terms of breeding and marketing in various countries, as we’ve seen in Section 2.2. 
These complexities do not preclude the “best practice” relationship, it actually 
addresses these issues. If a public institution is able use it’s own resources for field 
testing and trial development as well as incorporate it’s vast networks for regional 
testing, in exchange for private sector development and ownership of the final product, 
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the private-public relationship leaves desirability for future investments by addressing 
some of the risks of the testing process.  
Section 5: Conclusions: Policy Implications for African Seed Development  
Agro-industrialization has created added potential for biotech agricultural 
investments, domestic and foreign, through changing relationships in the food 
processing and retail sectors by vertical integration. Seed technology progress has lead 
to food fortification, such as incorporating essential vitamins and micro-nutrients in 
cereals and has created pest and disease resistant plants that are capable of 
withstanding harsh environments. Over the last decade, the United States enjoyed 
tripled investments in agricultural and food R&D, with private sector agricultural 
spending outpacing that of the public sector. A trend towards vertical integration has 
resulted between the farmer and the retailer in order to meet increased demands of a 
middle class with higher purchasing power and ensuring higher quality controls 
throughout the supply chain. 
In the case of Zambia visited in the introduction to this paper, Zambia 
currently lacks strong public-private partnerships to aid certified seed farmers, suffers 
from burdensome government involvement in seed trade regulations and lastly, lack of 
effective managerial and financial expertise in domestic seed companies to facilitate 
competitive improvements. In addition to institutional deficiencies, seed security is 
threatened by current Zambian regulations limiting seed donation programs in fear of 
farmers cultivating plants of unknown varieties that will threaten local genomic land 
races or counteract with natural pests and, destroy current seed distribution networks 
(Muliokela, 2004). Hence, the greatest potential impact from investing in the biotech 
seed industry will occur in economies with the absorptive capacity in terms of 
infrastructure, regulatory scheme and institutional support. 
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Kenya provides the perfect example of an emerging economy with an 
intermediate level of biotechnology, orienting towards a stable seed distribution 
network which is supporting the shift away from full dependency on the public sector 
for agri-technology development (Falconi, 1999). Kenya is in the process of 
establishing a fully functional biosafety regulatory system. The Kenya Agricultural 
Research institute (KARI) is the leading public institution in agricultural 
biotechnology and provides the only case in the continental region with field testing 
success of a hybrid variety. Furthermore, Kenya enjoys a strong public sector for 
biotech development by hosting the African Agricultural Technology Foundation 
(AATF), which transfers technology between the public and private sectors to the 
resource poor farmers. Kenya also houses the Bioscience Center for East and Central 
Africa and Kenya Agricultural Research Institute which is in collaboration with 
Monsanto and Syngenta Foundation6. It is the collaboration between researchers, 
extensionists, farmers and policymakers that allows these foundations to prioritize 
research projects and general development of agricultural biotechnology. In 1996 
Kenya formed a biosafety committee and prior to that the Industrial Property Act and 
Plant Varieties Act was implemented, in an effort to encourage private sector 
participation (Falconi, 1999). According to Falconi (1999) there is only one public 
research organization in the advanced stage of biotech development, whereas the other 
institutions are in the first stages. Odame et al. (2003) suggests that despite substantial 
interests by the Kenyan public sector of modern agricultural technologies, the slow 
progress is evidenced by low-tech applications. 
It is recommended that the best way to stimulate foreign investments into 
African agricultural research is to concentrate on the ability for countries such as 
Kenya or South Africa to accelerate partnerships with private seed research companies 
                                                 
 6Biotechnology in Kenya is benefits from a special program on Biotechnology  
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with a specific focus on projects with interregional impact. Public policy should thus 
facilitate collaborations by: 
1. Strengthening intellectual property rights laws that not only protect research 
conducted within the country, but provisions that protect seeds distribution and 
marketing as well as clear penalties for violations.  
2. Increase administrative resources in regulation and biosafety departments. It is 
an absolute necessity to decrease the time to wait for a seed company wanting 
to begin field testing of important crops. The capacity of government 
departments not only comes in terms of increased staff sizes, but also 
knowledge of national and international laws 
3. Ease research networks between countries by harmonization of biosafety and 
intellectual property laws. 
These policy suggestions hinge on the ability for a private company’s perception for 
success. Intellectual property laws ensure investments are protected, but it also 
addresses the issue of market structure.  
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Appendix: Economic/Mathematical Model 
As the structure and depth of influence of the private sector has expanded to 
support growth in international markets, intellectual property rights and liberalization 
of the seed markets has begun to account for the specific implications to private 
industry involvement and it’s relevance to the role of local seed companies and public 
sector institutions. Biotechnology investment decisions are a function of market 
knowledge size, size of economies in production and recipient country regulations. 
These elements are also sources of uncertainty and risk for any private sector seed 
venture. In the end, the ability for private sector development at the local and MNC 
level is a function of the perceived returns on investment and on shareholder equity. 
The source of uncertainty can be generalized into two realms: regulatory and 
technical. Regulatory uncertainty is a result of national and regional policy related to 
intellectual property and patent rights, seed demand, research infrastructure, as well as 
the international economic stability. Technical uncertainty is a function of level and 
ability of vertical integration which affects the ease of research and development of a 
product and is largely influenced by the presence of other seed companies and NARS 
(Brennan et al [2001]). 
Using the best practice scenario developed in Section 3, let us assume an MNC 
enters into a licensing relationship with a research center in the market of interest 
(Krattiger, 2002). Of course this is not a risk-less venture, despite having developed 
the initial research, there are weaknesses associated with possible opportunistic 
behavior among parties, information asymmetry, general uncertainty on performance 
of technology in the new market (Bessey et al., 2002). The general risks associated 
with the limitations on the scope of the patent, possibility of inventing around it and 
the difficulty of regulation is a function of the general strength of the regulatory 
framework within the biotech industry (Bessey et al, 2002). The uncertainty hurdle is 
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further compounded by the interest of time: time to wait out the regulatory process and 
time to build and development. Once time and uncertainty are overcome, a product 
may reach the market and a firm can realize certain revenues. Until then, however the 
decision to invest is hastened under uncertainty, where firm would prefer to enter 
immediately in order to avoid the future opportunity costs (Bar-Ilan and Stange, 
1996).  
Lavoie and Sheldon (2003) suggests real options as an adequate framework to 
assess the comparative advantage and dynamic trade relations between biotech 
investment decisions in the US and Europe. Given the option to invest in the US and 
EU, Lavoie and Sheldon (2003) found the incentives for private firms to exercise the 
option to invest in the US was a result of the presence of higher comparative per-
period rates of investment and less regulatory uncertainty despite rising R&D costs. 
The option to invest is thus subject to various forms of regulatory uncertainty. 
Gravel et al. (2004) use a simple real options framework to analyze the process of a 
regulatory review for an investment option in the Ontario electricity market. Similar to 
a biotech decision, these investment are lagged, irreversible, whose value varies 
randomly, but the firm must, nonetheless, incur upfront costs to launch the regulatory 
process (Gravel et al., 2003). Specifically, the probability of success is a direct 
function of the uncertainty of the regulatory process since it contributes to the delay 
the decision to initiate the regulatory process and invest in the project.  
Following from Bar-Ilan and Stange (1996) and Gravel (2004), the option to 
start a project can be perceived in terms of the expected net value of the project V(X), 
itself. The decision to start the project then becomes feasible if the expected net value 
is ‘high enough’, i.e. can at the very least recoup the sunk costs of investment at both 
stages as outlined above. The expectations from the project is subject to the 
uncertainty of risks associated with regulatory approval and costs of the process. The 
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probability of receiving approval, q(x) ∈( , )0 1   can then be accounted for by a standard 
normal CDF, φ ϖ( , )m  , where for a given realization of x, the probability of a positive 
outcome is a function of 2 parameters (Gravel, 2004).  
 
  
So, the probability of receiving regulatory approval must equal the expected net value 
of the project at that point: 
 φ φρR R R T P R Pox V x C q x e y T f y T x dyR( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , : )= = − + −
∞∫ 7 
                                                 
 7It is assumed that the flow of new project benefits follow a geometric 
Brownian motion and is a lognormal density function:  
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Where the net present value during the regulatory process is contingent on 
the costs of the regulatory process and the probability of regulatory 
approval, q(x) ∈( , )0 1 , and a function of the cumulative probability of success from 
the investment project, φP  , and time for the regulatory process to be complete, TR 
whose risk is adjusted by interest rate, ρ. Given this, we can say that there exists a 
value, xR
* , for which values below it,  would be optimal for a firm to wait before 
beginning the regulatory process and above would indicate it is beneficial to begin the 
regulatory process (Gravel, 2004). 
 Let us assume that x xR R> * . It is appropriate to assume that the approval period 
for the project would last for a limited time, TA , for which period project uncertainty 
is subject to changes to the overall socio-economic conditions beyond control of the 
firm. Also, let T* be the time at which the firm begins the regulatory process. In the 
deterministic case, the flow of net project benefits is known and the regulatory process 
will definitely success, q(x)=1. Unlike the stochastic problem, the firm knows how X 
changes and it can immediately make all necessary decisions. Since X moves in GBM, 
X t X e t( ) ( )= 0 μ and μ is the growth rate of project benefits, the firm’s maximization 
objective function is: 
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Gravel (2004) solves for T* to be 
 
 
 
 
where the numerator the log function is the annualized project cost and the 
denominator is the value of the flow of project benefits once the projected is 
completed in the deterministic case. Hence, the value of X at which the firm should 
decide to enter the regulatory process is T*, i.e. when flow of project benefits equal 
annualized project costs: 
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Once solving for T*, we can maximize the objective function of the firm to obtain, the 
optimal net profit of the firm: 
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Example of Application 
T*: Optimal Time to Begin An Investment Project & : Threshold Value of 
Expected Net Benefits 
From our solution for T*, we see that T is an increasing function of costs of 
regulatory process, costs of project, time for project and interest rates. Intuitively, as 
the perceived costs of starting and conducting a project increases, a firm would wait 
longer before starting the regulatory procedures for the investment project since it 
would reduce the present value of the project. Since the firm incurs sunk costs for both 
phases of the investment project, a higher interest rate would increase the opportunity 
cost of the project. Gravel (2004) notes that T* actually first decreases and then 
increases as the time for completing the regulatory process increases. Since a small 
increase in the waiting time for regulatory approval has negligible impact of the future 
discounted net benefits, it doesn’t affect the fact that the firm would rather act sooner 
rather than later. From the objective function we also note that T* is a decreasing 
function of μ, since as the growth of project benefits increase, the firm is likely to 
invest sooner. The threshold value of the expected net benefits shares similar 
relationship with T*. μ shares similar relationship as optimal time.   
 π *  increases with μ and decreases with costs and time.  
Analytical Assessment: The Case of Ag-Biotech Investments in Kenya 
Following from De Greef (2004), regulatory clearance for developers to 
market a crop already registered in the main export market is estimated to be between 
$7 and $15 million. The total cost of product development will be estimated at twice 
this, as De Greef (2004) suggests that the financial burden of regulatory clearance 
absorbs about half of the total product development investments. A biosafety 
assessment of a GM crops is estimated between $0.8 to $2 million. The best practice 
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model is assumed and for a cash crop, such as cotton. The cotton includes both the 
small scale, localized farmer and larger, export oriented producer.   
Consider the following parameters and range of values for a sensitivity analysis.  
α  {0.5,0.66,0.75,0.8} 
ω {0.5,1.00,1.50} 
Time for Regulatory  
approval 
{
  
1,2,3,4} 
Cost for Compliance {0.16,.7,2,4} 
Duration of 
Regulatory Approval 
{3,5,7,10,25} 
Cost for Product 
Development 
{.4,1.75,5,10} 
μ {.01,.02,.044} 
  
The average per year regulatory cost per crop is $0.16 million, with almost 
75% of the research focus on crop research (Falconi, 1999 and Sithole-Niang et al, 
2004). Once the approval process is over, the investor has a limited period of time to 
act. In the EU, if a crop has been approved for market, the applicant has 10 years to 
bring the product to market. From time of approval to expiration, developers accrue 
risks in the product development pipeline. However, as outlined earlier, given the 
technology’s market potential, and general ability to invest significant resources into 
facilitating technologies through regulatory processes, public research lags and the 
private industry remains the major source of stimulating a biotech industrial cluster 
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(Sithole-Niang et al., 2004). This would then run in Matlab or similar simulation 
package that allows the derived probability functions to be programmed. 
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